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The US beef industry has undergone significant structural changes in the last 30 
years at the wholesale and retail levels. Meanwhile producer prices have failed to keep 
pace with increases in the price of beef received by wholesalers and retailers, resulting in 
concerns being raised about market power being exercised in the beef industry by 
stakeholders. 
This study uses marketing margins to determine what factors affect margins, test 
for differences among different procurement methods of purchasing cattle, and test for 
differences among different cuts of beef. This paper extends previous research providing 
more detail regarding the factors that may effect margins and differentiating by not just 
looking at aggregate margins between producers and wholesalers, and wholesalers and 
retailers.  
The results suggest that for margins between wholesalers and retailers industry 
concentration measures do appear to have statistically significant effect on margins for 
some products. While an increase in wholesaler concentration does not appear to 




insignificance, cost efficiencies achieved from this strategy may be exhausted. Evidence 
indicates that cost variables do have an effect on margins between wholesalers and 
retailers although, the magnitude of their effect on margins may be linked to the value US 
consumers place on different cuts. For instance, low value cuts such as ground beef were 
more sensitive to a change in diesel prices compared to higher value cuts such as steak 
rounds. While four-firm concentration ratios were significant for products such as ground 
beef and steak, they are not significant for round roast or steak round products.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
In light of structural changes that have taken place in the beef industry there are 
concerns that some players in the supply chain might possess market power. Market 
power is described as the ability of agents to alter prices for their own benefit (Perloff, 
2011). In other words, these firms become price makers. This could occur when there are 
one or a small number of agents supplying a market.  These agents may increase the price 
of output for their own benefit or firms may decrease the price paid to procure inputs -- 
for example, paying a lower price for live cattle while maintaining market share. As a 
result there is a concern among regulators to ensure that other agents (producers) are not 
the victim of unfair practices. Regulators have made provisions and introduced legislation 
in an effort to maintain a competitive environment in agricultural product markets 
(Sumner & Ahn, 2008).   
Dominant firms in a market potentially have the capacity to exercise market power, even 
though dominant firms may decide not to use their position in a market to their 
advantage. This is known to raise difficulties for regulators on detecting such practices as 
highly concentrated markets are not sufficient by themselves for market power to be 
exercised or to exist. Increased concentration is a concern, as firms may be able to engage 
in collusion whether explicitly or tacitly agreed, with less difficulty in a highly 
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concentrated industry. Alternatively, increased concentration may be beneficial, by 
allowing stakeholders to achieve gains in efficiencies such as economies of scale. These 
economies of scale may not be possible, where there are a large number of industry 
participants operating small businesses. In the meatpacking sector, wholesalers are said to 
be passing on some of the gains they’ve achieved in efficiency to their suppliers (Ward, 
2013). In a GIPSA report; larger plants were found to pay more for cattle (GIPSA, 1996). 
Increased concentration or the emergence of large firms may also be the result of large 
retailers having a preference for dealing with fewer and larger firms. The GIPSA report 
indicates that there is no evidence of market power in the meat wholesaling sector, but it 
recognizes that under different market conditions and/or changes in the structure of the 
industry this finding may be different (GIPSA, 1996).  This evidence suggests that with 
even higher concentration there may be a point where efficiency gains are exhausted or 
limited.  
Due to this complexity, investigations of this nature have been known to be 
expensive and time consuming (Lloyd & Morgan, 2007). In other industries with lower 
concentration levels, results have indicated that improvements in efficiency can be 
achieved through consolidation of sectors resulting in firms’ output increasing (Torres & 
Morrison Paul, 2006). This raises questions about how much concentration is optimal 
which may be different for different industries. 
 Since 1980, producers’ share of the retail price has either declined or remained 
constant in real terms. The retailer’s share has increased during the same period, which 
has raised concerns of the exercise of market power (Sexton & Zhang, 2000). However it 
is not necessarily the case that an increase in marketing margins between supply chain 
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participants of the US beef industry is an indication of unfair practices. Kuosmanen and 
Niemi offer several explanations as to how widening margins between supply chain 
participants in agricultural product industries may be due to factors other than market 
power such as larger productivity improvements at the producer level compared to the 
wholesaler or retailer level (Kuosmanen & Niemi, 2009). 
1.1 Problem Statement 
In the livestock industry it is understood that profitability fluctuates over time, 
with regular periods where losses were incurred by producers. While this may be due to 
demand and supply factors, there have been questions regarding whether or not industry 
participants have been partaking in anticompetitive practices, to the detriment of others in 
the beef industry. This has been an issue for some time, with producers suspected to be 
the victims of such practices by downstream firms, i.e. wholesalers and retailers forcing 
producers to accept a lower price for output.  
Researchers have done work in this area, with some arguing that there is evidence 
of market power in the industry (Azzam, 1997). Others have made different assumptions, 
and have come to different conclusions or that cooperative regimes only existed during 
times when cattle slaughter levels were lower than expected (Cai, Stiegert, & Koontz, 
2011). The evidence of market power in the beef industry is inconclusive and the issue 
may vary by geographic regions in the US (Crespi, Tian, & Rodney, 2010). 
There is general agreement among researchers that the beef industry of today is 
different from that of twenty years ago, as the industry has become more concentrated 
(Cai, Stiegert, & Koontz, 2011). These changes have been attributed to a variety of 
factors, including changes in consumer preferences (Barkema, Drabenstott, & Novack, 
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2001). With improvements in technology, consumers are becoming increasingly 
knowledgeable and consequently, retailers are putting increasing pressure on wholesalers 
to perform, while at the same time there has been increased consolidation and 
wholesalers have become more vertically integrated. This has mainly taken place through 
upstream integration, i.e. wholesalers becoming involved in beef production activities. 
The poultry industry was early to adopt this approach, and has done so to the extent that 
now almost all chickens are reared under contract. In more recent times the pork industry 
has followed suit. This trend has led to the concerns regarding the effects of a more 
concentrated market.  
Wholesalers in the beef industry have become more involved in upstream 
activities to a lesser extent than their counterparts in the pork and poultry industries, but 
the transition has encountered problems with the issue of market power again raising its 
head. As beef wholesalers have sought to use contracts to source raw material and with 
other changes in the industry structure, there are now fewer buyers for beef animals in the 
marketplace. This would suggest that market power could exist and that the potential for 
industry participants to exercise such power could increase (Mac Donald & Korb, 2011). 
Oligopoly theory suggests that as an industry becomes more consolidated, there is 
an opportunity to exercise market power on other players in the value chain. However 
Crespi’s recent article suggests that even though wholesalers may find themselves in a 
position or have the ability to exercise market power on upstream firms, the extent 
wholesalers can use this might be limited. The consequences of wholesalers exercising 
such power could force producers to shut down, and as a result these wholesalers could 
lose their supply base of raw material (Crespi, Saitone, & Sexton, 2012). Where 
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throughput is vital to remain viable and processing plants are very specialized, 
wholesalers must ensure that their suppliers also remain viable.  
The problem is the combination of vertical integration and market power in an 
industry that has undergone structural changes. This industry now has more tightly 
aligned supplier-buyer value chains characterized by synergism and co-dependence, 
which gives rise to the question of what kind of pricing behavior buyers will exhibit. This 
question centers on the conditions under which prices are determined, i.e. perfectly or 
imperfectly competitive conditions, and the concern over how the producer’s share of the 
retail price has declined over time. Are the changes that have taken place in the U.S. beef 
industry motivated by industry participants desire to gain control of the marketplace, or 
have participants chosen a more consolidated structure to achieve economies of scale? 
What explains the changes in the price spread between farm gate and retail prices?  
1.2 The Objective of this Research 
This research can serve to inform stakeholders in the industry and help encourage 
trust amongst industry participants.  
The specific objectives are to: 
1. Determine the economic factors that might be associated with changes in margins 
between producers and wholesalers, and between wholesalers and retailers. 
Marketing margins are econometrically investigated to see what factors may 
potentially cause food prices to increase or decrease and do retail prices or 
wholesale prices fall by the same margin. 
6 
 
2. To determine which industry participants incur increased costs of production, or is 
an increase in costs or an improvement in productivity passed on to other 
participants in the supply chain. 
The goal is to determine how costs or other variables affect margins between 
supply chain participants under different procurement methods and retail cuts. To 
compare how an increase in costs for a retailer may be passed on to wholesalers and how 
much of this cost is passed on under different cuts and livestock procurement methods. 
1.3 Overview of the Industry 
As of 2012 the US cattle inventory was approximately 90 million head and was 
worth $44 billion in farm gate receipts. More than 50% of production takes place in five 
states, namely, Texas, Nebraska, Missouri, Oklahoma and South Dakota. 
Slaughtering that takes place in this region takes place, for the most part, in plants 
that have the capacity to slaughter 4,000 to 5,000 cattle each day and are typically 
involved in fabrication of the carcass (Mac Donald, Ollinger, Nelson, & Handy, 2000). 
Less than 34 million head were slaughtered in 2012 at plants under USDA inspection, 
resulting in 43.4 billion pounds of beef. In 2009, per capita expenditure on beef stood at 
$261.90, which represented 47.8% of expenditure on meat (NCBA, 2013a). The 25 
largest feedlot operations in the US accounted for almost 5.25 million animals, which 
indicates that beef production is far less concentrated than the wholesaling and retail 
sectors. For instance, the top four wholesalers in the U.S. are, Cargill Meat Solutions, 
Tyson Foods Inc., JBS Beef Co and National Beef Packing Company LLC. While some 
data is not reported for JBS in 2011, total sales were valued at $10 billion and the 
company slaughtered 6.6 million head (NCBA, 2013b).  
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The four-firm concentration ratio for the slaughter of steers and heifers has 
increased from 79% in 2002 to 84% in 2011. In 2012 the majority of animals were 
sourced through formula and negotiated spot market arrangements, with 17% sourced 
through packer owned supplies and forward contracts (USDA, 2013b).  
The food retailing sector has also experienced an increase in concentration over 
time, although the CR4 for retailers is somewhat lower compared to the wholesaling 
industry. For instance, in 2008 the CR4 for retailers was approximately 38.1% with 
Walmart, Kroger, Safeway and Supervalu being the dominant players at a national level. 
Concentration of the food retailing sector can, however, be higher or lower in different 
regions, and the main participants in different regions are known to differ as well 
(Richards & Pofahl, 2010).
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Market power in the beef industry has been a concern for quite some time. 
Recently, it has been noted that in 1980 the top four beef wholesalers accounted for 36% 
of the market while in 2010 the top four firms accounted for 85% (USDA, 2012). 
Increased concentration has motivated debate about how such developments could give 
rise to anti-competitive behavior by those involved in meat production and marketing 
activities (Becker, 2007). In light of recent changes that have taken place in the industry, 
the primary concern is that as a result of increased concentration amongst beef 
wholesalers through mergers and acquisitions, wholesalers could gain the ability to pay 
less for cattle (Cai, Stiegert, Koontz, 2009). The emergence of a highly concentrated 
retail sector, due to the recent rise of supercenters like Walmart, has complicated the 
question of whether any participant exercises market power in the supply chain, and if so, 
who does so. Increases in concentration amongst retailers in the US is a concern due to 
the belief that when a retailer can obtain discounts due to its size, could give large 
retailers the ability to use price discrimination practices when competing with smaller 
rival competitors (Dobson & Waterson, 2003). 
The rest of this chapter focuses on the issues delving further into why market power in 
the US beef industry is suspected. Previous research in this area is cited with regard to 
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why these concerns might be unwarranted and/or overstated as there may be other factors 
at play in the industry. The discussion continues by discussing how price spreads have 
changed over time and explaining why this may be the case, followed by a discussion of 
the criteria for perfect competition to exist in an industry and what factors might result in 
a highly concentrated industry. The chapter then continues by discussing how firm 
behavior over different time periods may not be identical. Lastly, a summary of literature 
is discussed with respect to the retail industry, along with a description of the concerns of 
a highly concentrated retail industry. Under each heading a brief summary is given of the 
main findings in the literature with respect to each issue which is then discussed in more 
detail. 
2.1 Changes in the Price Spread 
Other indicators of market power in the beef industry have been noted in relation 
to the farm wholesale price spread. There appears to be general agreement in the 
literature that marketing costs have contributed to increasing price spreads. The evidence 
of four-firm concentration ratios affecting margins is inconclusive and is discussed 
below.  
McEowen, Carstensen and Harl point out that there should be a decrease in the 
margin or price spread as slaughtering costs per unit fall. Since the mid-1990s, however, 
this has not been the case, as the farm-wholesale margin has increased. This is 
inconsistent with conditions of a perfectly competitive market (McEowen, Carstensen, & 
Harl, 2002). In response to the farm wholesale margin increasing, wholesalers argue this 
is due to value adding activities and efficiency improvements that have been achieved at 
the wholesaling level (McEowen, Carstensen, & Harl, 2002).  
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Lloyd et al. test for buyer power in the UK beef industry by analyzing price 
spreads -- if the price spread between farm and retail prices widens this acts as a first 
indicator that market power may be present (Lloyd T. , McCorriston, Morgan , Rayner, & 
Weldegebriel, 2009). It is acknowledged that a widening price spread may occur due to 
other factors, such as an increase in marketing costs (Lloyd, McCorriston, Morgan, 
Rayner, & Weldegebriel 2009; Kousmanen & Niemi, 2009; Wilson & Kinsella, 2004). 
Sexton and Zhang find that marketing costs account for the majority of food costs and 
that marketing costs’ share of food costs have increased over time (Sexton & Zhang, 
2000).  
From 1960 to 1980 the farm’s share of expenditure of the USDA’s “market 
basket” was 40%, but this figure declined to 22% by 1998. The farm’s declining share of 
consumer expenditure can be attributed to other factors apart from the presence of market 
power, but could be due to people eating out more often which entails more marketing 
services being delivered (Sexton & Zhang, 2000). Similar research looking at the 
Australian retail meat sector showed a divergence between livestock and retail prices for 
meat. It is believed that the change in these prices is unlikely to be a result of an increase 
in market power of retailers (Hyde & Perloff, 1998). The Government Accountability 
Office shows in a 2009 report, that between 1982 and 2009, beef, dairy, grain and pork 
products farm prices in the US increased by 34%. During the same period, retail prices 
increased by 128% and producer prices have failed to keep pace with inflation. This 
report offers a possible explanation for the difference between farm and retail prices by 
looking at the marketing bill for food, where farm prices are shown to have declined by 
10% and it is mostly packaging costs that have increased. Other variables such as profits, 
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labor, energy etc. for the most part remaining unchanged for the same period on a 
percentage basis (GAO, 2009).  
Parker and Zilberman adopted this approach in analyzing margins in the fresh 
fruit industry where the margin is a function of marketing costs and quality 
characteristics. Because fresh fruits are perishable and seasonal, margins for such 
products are characterized as being a function of marketing costs along with other quality 
related characteristics. For instance, consumers may pay a premium for strawberries early 
in the season. Parker and Zilberman acknowledge that for other more durable products, 
their assumptions made in the context of fresh fruits may not apply. For example, they 
assume that as quality characteristics increase within a marketing season, marketing costs 
will also increase as greater losses may be incurred (Parker & Zilberman, 1993). For meat 
products, quality characteristics are certainly important but may not be subject to the 
same seasonal changes that fresh fruits might undergo each season. 
Wohlgenant and Mullen propose that in observing such behavior and estimating 
the effects different variables can have on price spreads requires a comprehensive 
analysis of the behavior of participants in the market. The authors specify market 
behavior equations. This market behavior equation analysis was conducted with the 
margin defined as the difference between the retail and farm gate price. Three models 
were investigated: a mark-up pricing model, a relative price spread model and a real price 
spread model which basically is an extension of the relative price spread model. The 
authors conclude that the relative price spread model performs better than the mark up 
pricing model, which they argue is due to changes in demand and supply (Wohlgenant & 
Mullen, 1987) . 
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In Armah’s analysis of beef marketing margins, an augmented relative price 
spread model is used to explain margins in the beef supply chain. He argues that it is 
likely that an increase in concentration in the retail sector relative to the wholesale beef 
sector has an effect on marketing margins between wholesalers and retailers. This 
increase in concentration amongst retailers is identified as taking place during 1999, 
when a wave of mergers and acquisitions amongst retailers took place. The implications 
of such changes in the market are that retailers post-1999, may have an increased ability 
to demand lower prices for beef from wholesalers. This could then force wholesalers to 
pay lower prices for raw material, in this case live cattle (Armah, 2012). Armah uses a 
similar model to that of the Capps et al. model to test for whether changes in 
concentration in the retail sector have an effect on marketing margins. He finds that the 
effect of an increase in retail concentration does have a positive and significant effect on 
margins (Armah, 2012).  
In the Capps et al., model the relative price spread model proposed in Wohlgenant 
and Mullen’s research is modified to include a measure of concentration amongst 
wholesalers and a time trend is included to account for technical change. Capps et al.’s 
model includes marketing costs, demand and price data to determine how these factors 
affect margins in the US lamb industry. A four-firm concentration ratio and marketing 
costs were found to have a positive effect on lamb margins i.e. the margin or price spread 
between industry participants increases (Capps, Byrne, & Williams, 1995). Armah uses a 
similar equation to the basic equation in Wohlgenant and Mullen’s (1987) paper and adds 
a measure of labor productivity and the price of a substitute product (Armah, 2012). The 
inclusion of a measure of productivity can help to identify how changes in productivity 
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arising from processing or marketing technology could potentially affect margins (Marsh, 
& Brester, 2004). Theoretically, where an improvement is seen in productivity it would 
be expected that margins between producers and wholesalers, and wholesalers and 
retailers would increase. An improvement could decrease per unit costs and some or 
maybe all of this cost saving would be passed on to other participants in the value chain.  
2.2 Criteria for Perfect Competition 
It is unclear if the beef industry is a perfectly or close to being a perfectly 
competitive market due to the current structure of the industry. Likewise recent efforts by 
policy makers to improve competitiveness in the industry may not actually achieve its 
objectives. 
Where there is market power, there is a difference between the price offered and 
the competitive price. Determining the competitive price is essential to decide whether 
market power is being exercised. This competitive price according to Sumner and Ahn is 
determined by obtaining sellers’ marginal costs and buyers’ willingness to pay (Sumner 
& Ahn, 2008). Rhodus et al. define a market where competitive prices exist to be one 
consisting of:  
- A large number of both buyers and sellers. 
- Neither of whom have the ability to influence prices in a market. 
- Where a standardized product or grade of product is exchanged  
- Parties can enter and/or exit freely 
- Parties can get access to information that is readily available (Rhodus, Baldwin, 
& Henderson, 1989).  
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It would appear that the beef industry does not, or does not fully satisfy all of 
these conditions, which may be another reason this industry has attracted such attention 
over time. This view is further supported by Wachenheim and DeVuyst who describe 
markets as being imperfect with risk also being a factor. In the livestock industry there is 
a time lag which limits the ability of participants to respond to market signals 
(Wachenheim & DeVuyst, 2001). Efforts to improve competitiveness or at least make the 
industry more transparent have taken place through the introduction of mandatory price 
reporting legislation introduced in 1999. However it has been shown in other industries 
that making price information publicly available can act to encourage collusive behavior. 
With less transparency the argument is that bidders are not aware of their competitor’s 
bids and this can benefit sellers (Wachenheim & DeVuyst, 2001). 
2.3 Other Factors that may lead to Increases in Concentration 
The literature suggests that cost savings from increases in concentration need to 
be relatively small to be welfare enhancing. Even though there may be an increased 
ability to collude in a concentrated market, previous research suggests that industries 
become consolidated to pursue other objectives.  
Another side of the argument for increased concentration is that it could allow 
wholesalers to achieve cost efficiencies. These cost efficiencies have been found to 
outweigh the negative effects or welfare losses which may be suffered by producers and 
consumers which would suggest that further concentration of the beef industry would 
enhance social welfare (Ji, 2008). Schroeder, Azzam and Zhang consider the issue of 
market power in a marketplace where buyers and sellers may be relatively concentrated 
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in a market described as having a bilateral oligopoly which could give rise to three 
potential outcomes: 
1. Both buyers and sellers take price as given and thus the outcome is competitive. 
2. Sellers are price takers while buyers may or may not exercise market power. 
3. Buyers are price takers while sellers may or may not exercise market power. 
The US beef industry appears to be a good fit for this paradigm as both 
wholesalers and retailers are deemed to be highly concentrated. Determining prices and 
quantities can explain whether or not buyers or sellers behave in an uncompetitive 
manner, while allowing for the possibility of the exercise of market power by either side. 
Schroeder, Azzam and Zhang attempt to address concerns of the balance of power 
shifting toward retailers in recent years is warranted or not. The results suggested that 
wholesalers behaved as price takers with retailers exercising some oligopsony power 
(Schroeder, Azzam, & Zhang, 2000).  
In another paper, Schroeder and Azzam analyze marketing margins in the pork 
industry where there is uncertainty in terms of output prices, and pork wholesalers may 
have the ability to exercise market power. The results suggest that between the period of 
1972 and 1988, the hog wholesaling industry became more concentrated and the 
oligopsony component declined in significance, becoming insignificant after the first half 
of 1976. The authors note that this is counterintuitive, expecting market power to become 
an even more important issue in a more concentrated industry. One possible hypothesis 
proposed is that bigger plants can achieve cost savings, which are greater than the 
benefits achieved from oligopolistic behavior (Schroeder & Azzam, 1991). Another 
complaint often raised is that producers are often limited to sellers they can feasibly sell 
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their output to, due to the nature of the output which is bulky and perishable, making it 
expensive to transport. Durham and Sexton focused on the tomato industry and the 
potential of monopsony power being exercised. Their results indicate that wholesalers 
have limited ability to exercise market power on suppliers with rival markets nearby. The 
ability to transport tomatoes greater distances than in the past, and associations 
representing grower interests are cited by the authors as factors that may have helped to 
keep the tomato industry competitive (Durham & Sexton, 1992). Beef producers may too, 
have an increased ability to transport animals greater distances, although in some regions 
it still may not be possible for producers to access wholesalers further away, which might 
reduce the competitive environment in that particular region. 
Azzam and Schroeder explore the issue of consolidation amongst meat 
wholesalers and compare the potential for anticompetitive practices to exist with 
estimated cost savings, both of which have different welfare effects. Different 
simulations were run with different levels of concentration. Their results suggest that to 
compensate for a 50% increase in concentration in the beef wholesaling sector would 
require a reduction of under 1% in costs per unit in all simulations. The results suggest 
that cost savings achieved through consolidation required to offset the increase in 
industry concentration can be relatively small (Azzam & Schroeder, 1995).  Ultimately 
the issue here is that if there is sufficient competition that can limit the exercise of market 
power, then some of the gains wholesalers have obtained from cost economies through 
operating larger and multiple plants and other efficiencies can be passed on to other 
supply chain participants. The question is, however; have such efficiency gains been 
passed on to producers and/or consumers? Or have wholesalers been able to exploit their 
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position in the market place to their own advantage and as a result receive excess profits? 
(Morisson Paul, 2001). The report conducted by GIPSA suggests that in the past cost 
savings have been passed on to producers in the form of higher prices (GIPSA, 1996). 
2.4 Capacity Utilization vs. Exercising Market Power 
In an industry that is characterized as being a fixed cost intensive business, the 
motivation to utilize capacity is warranted with increases in concentration said to have 
resulted in suppliers benefitting too. Other factors mentioned with respect to capacity 
utilization is that industry participants have an incentive to protect their suppliers close to 
their facility. 
Wachenheim and DeVuyst explain that there is potential for significant 
information asymmetries to exist between firms, wholesalers who have high fixed costs 
preferring to opt to achieve better utilization of capacity indicating that competitive 
action amongst wholesalers has not declined over time (Wachenheim & DeVuyst, 2001). 
This suggests that the opportunity for firms to exert market power in their industry may 
not occur, as these businesses have the incentive to fully utilize plant capacity. Hunnicut 
and Weninger raise the question of whether wholesalers can, in fact, exercise market 
power even if they do have it. Furthermore, Hunnicut and Weninger argue that only 
looking at prices to detect market power may be misleading through using conjectural 
variation models. These models are described as being static, while competition and the 
firm exist over several periods. Only considering one period ignores the fact, that 
wholesalers may be motivated to maintain throughput versus maximizing profits in a 
single period (Hunnicut & Weninger, 1999). In addition to this concern, the geographic 
constraint faced by producers mentioned earlier also applies to wholesalers, in that the 
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ability to relocate a manufacturing facility would be expected to be somewhat limited. As 
a result, it could be argued these wholesalers could have a vested interest in ensuring 
suppliers close to the plant remain in business. In theory both parties should at least 
recognize that future dealings will take place and by one punishing the other or using 
their power, may not be in their best interest in the long term (Hunnicut & Weninger, 
1999).  
The logic behind plants being motivated to achieve economies of scale and 
maintain throughput in an effort to fully utilize plant capacity is warranted. This is 
supported by a study carried out by GIPSA, which found that those plants that had higher 
capacity utilization rates paid higher prices for cattle (GIPSA, 1996). This would seem to 
suggest that producers benefit from increased concentration, as in this case, producers 
were suggested to have received some of the cost savings from wholesalers operating 
larger plants (Barkema, Drabenstott, & Novack, 2001). This view is also supported by 
Morrisson Paul’s 2001 paper which found that evidence of oligopsony power in the beef 
sector is negligible. At the same time Morrison Paul, acknowledges that while 
wholesalers may have such power, the increased utilization of capacity was found to 
more than compensate for some small ability a wholesaler may have in pricing power 
(Morisson Paul, 2001). Mac Donald and others argue, that in order for consolidation to be 
driven by firms attempting to achieve scale economies, these economies of scale must 
appear over a range of plant sizes and not amongst very small plants. They also argue that 
the current larger plants must have a cost advantage over those plants that were operating 
in the past. For example, the largest plant in 2010 should be achieving cost advantages 
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that are larger, than what similar plants had in the 1980’s (Mac Donald, Ollinger, Nelson, 
& Handy, 2000).   
2.5 Time Inconsistency 
Research suggests that a firm’s market behavior changes over time due to 
conditions in the market the firm operates in. Although, a homogenous product is being 
traded in this industry some firms are said to have different valuations for different 
animals making it challenging for firms to offer a single price for all animals. 
The beef industry is subject to exogenous factors such as disease outbreaks and 
developing countries’ increased desire to consume animal based products rather than 
grains. As a result, changes in demand and supply can play a role in determining the 
competitiveness of the industry. This can give rise to wholesalers or other industry 
participants displaying behavior that is not the same across all periods. Other research in 
this area has focused on regime behavior in that wholesaling firms will switch between 
cooperative and competitive regimes depending on market conditions (Cai, Stiegert, & 
Koontz, 2009). Some have found evidence that market power has been exercised, but that 
this conduct varied in different regions of the U.S. For example, Cai, Stiegert and Koontz 
find that the probability of cooperation was higher in Texas. In other regions such as 
Kansas they find that wholesalers are less likely to cooperate (Cai, Stiegert, & Koontz, 
2009).  
It is recognized that asymmetries may exist whereby certain characteristics can 
undermine the sustainability of cooperative bidding. As there are uncertainties about rival 
behavior, differences in plant technology and flexibility in capacity utilization may be 
needed to maintain cooperative bidding something which wholesalers may not be able to 
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achieve. Lastly, wholesalers may place different values on particular animals according 
to their characteristics, making it difficult to identify a focal point or an industrywide bid 
price (Wachenheim & DeVuyst, 2001). 
The above considerations have been largely concerned with meat wholesalers 
exercising market power on producers. However, wholesalers may also be able to 
exercise market power on their customers with the same considerations mentioned above 
being important. Charging or forcing retailers to pay higher prices, or to pay for a 
wholesaler’s increased costs, may reduce a retailer’s demand for a given firm’s product. 
Likewise, these wholesalers and retailers will have future dealings with one another and 
so the relationship can also be described as one of co-dependence and time inconsistency 
issues would also be expected to exist for interactions between these firms. 
2.6 Concerns about Changes in the Retail Sector 
Retailer concentration is a concern, although it is uncertain whether retailers have 
the ability to exercise market power on suppliers or consumers or both. Past research 
findings suggests that some of the increases in the retailers share of consumers’ food 
expenditure could be explained by increased marketing costs and declining labor 
productivity. 
The food retailing landscape began to change in the latter half of the 20th century, 
with a shift from locally owned food grocery stores to the rise of national supermarkets. 
Walmart supercenters have become a common feature in most US towns or cities, which 
has brought changes to the structure of the industry. These changes have raised concerns 
about whether must consumers pay a higher price for product in a highly concentrated 
market (Cotterill, 1999).  
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Increases in concentration of the retail sector have not gone unnoticed, with 
producers citing that increases in concentration amongst food retailers could have a 
negative impact on farm level prices. The concern highlighted by Marsh and Brester is 
that larger wholesaler retailer margins could give rise to lower producer prices (Marsh & 
Brester, 2004). They mention how inflation adjusted margins between farmers and 
wholesalers in the US declined by 57% for beef between 1970 and 1998, while during the 
same period the margin between wholesalers and retailers increased by 27% (Marsh, & 
Brester, 2004). Possibly another reason that retailers receive so much attention is that the 
retailer is the final stop for products. The concern is; are retailers earning higher margins 
due to the exercise of market power (Richards & Pofahl, 2010).  
The concern over retailers having market power is suggested to be more prevalent 
in highly concentrated markets. The four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) for retailers in 
2008 nationally was estimated to be 38.1% according to the USDA (ERS, 2014a). At a 
regional level Richards and Pofahl outline that the CR4 for retailers may be even larger 
and possibly as high as 80% or greater in some regions (Richards & Pofahl, 2010). 
Dobson and Waterson give an example of a basket of goods: if one were to purchase it in 
the UK where retailer concentration is higher than the US, this basket of goods would 
cost $100. The same basket of goods would cost $31 less in the US -- this could indicate 
the potential of a relationship between concentration and the retail price of food products 
(Dobson and Waterson, 1999). 
Such accusations by producers may be warranted, but this evidence is not 
complete, as wholesalers and retailers are subject to increased legislation concerning food 
production and manufacturing practices. The information governments and consumers 
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now demand relating to traceability and “GMO free” all result in industry participants 
incurring larger costs to meet such demands than what had to be incurred in the past. 
Similar to the argument made for consolidation of the wholesaling sector, retailers 
are also said to achieve scale economies through consolidation. Despite this, concerns 
still remain that an increase in concentration of retailers can have a negative effect on the 
competitive environment in food retailing.  
Despite these arguments for achieving economies of scale, concerns over the 
widening gap in marketing margins are still not addressed. Schroeder and Mintert 
identify this concern amongst hog producers when live animal prices decline at a faster 
pace or by greater amounts than the retail prices. One possible explanation offered is that 
the trend of a declining farm wholesale margin and an increasing wholesale retail margin 
might suggest that costs at wholesaling stages for pork and beef wholesalers have 
declined while during the same period, retailers’ store processing and marketing costs 
have increased. Schroeder and Mintert describe how labor productivity for wholesalers 
has increased by 2.5% annually between 1970 and 1995, while labor productivity for 
food retailers was found to have declined by 0.8% annually during the same period 
(Schroeder & Mintert , 2010). This finding is further supported by Hahn who finds that as 
grocery stores expanded the service component, greater costs were incurred and caused 
margins between wholesalers and retailers to expand (Hahn, 2004). 
2.7  Conclusion of Literature Review 
This literature review has shown that increases in concentration may not be a 
result of a desire to exercise market power on ones customers or suppliers. Analyzing 
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previous research reveals that a number of factors can give rise to a highly concentrated 
industry. Likewise, these factors may also have given rise to producer prices not 
increasing at the same rate compared to wholesalers or retailers, who are said to have 
incurred increased marketing costs. This literature can now help to guide our analysis in 
the next chapter in determining what variables to include in our analysis that could be 




CHAPTER 3 DATA AND ESTIMATION 
This chapter describes the model and the data collected on prices for live cattle, 
wholesale beef prices and retail prices of beef. These prices will be used to calculate 
margins/price spreads between industry participants. For simplicity it is assumed that 
there are three main industry participants namely producers, wholesalers and retailers, 
although in real life, this may not be true. Wholesalers in this analysis represents those 
firms involved in processing live cattle. These margins are regressed on independent 
variables to test for the effect of for example, cost variables or four-firm concentration 
measures which potentially could have an effect on margins between supply chain 
participants. The chapter begins by describing the data used in the analysis, the reasoning 
behind the inclusion of the independent variables, and the expected relationship of these 
variables with the margins used in the analysis. Towards the end of this chapter the 
empirical equations are specified. 
Like any other firm, wholesalers are assumed to maximize profits by purchasing a 
raw material, processing or adding value to it, incurring costs in the process of adding 
this value and then selling the final product to customers. The model is centered on a 
price spread model which is a function of variables that may affect the margins between 
supply chain participants. The effect can be negative where a change in one variable  
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might cause the margin between two parties to decline. This would suggest that if 
margins were to increase, the competitive environment is less intense or demand for 
product has decreased. The chapter begins by describing the basic assumptions of how 
firms might interact in a market. A description is provided of other work done in this area 
and factors that may have a significant impact on margins in the industry are discussed. 
A theoretical model proposed by Crespi, Saitone and Sexton (CSS) is based on 
the argument that concerns relating to buyers having market power may have been 
misguided in the past. CSS outline how previous models used to uncover buyer power 
failed to consider other factors, such as long run interests and maintaining a symbiotic 
relationship. The issue is that although markets have become more concentrated, with 
activities managed by an ever decreasing number of players, more concentration need not 
indicate the presence of buyer power. An ever increasing number of transactions in 
agriculture are conducted through the use of contracts, and for these procurement 
methods to be successful in the long run, a stable relationship between the contracting 
parties is necessary. If wholesalers were to exercise buyer power in the market for live 
animals this would involve influencing the price paid to producers. As a consequence of 
paying lower prices, this would reduce the number of animals being purchased in an 
effort to increase profits. The result of paying lower prices for live cattle would have an 
adverse impact on farm profits and could lead to producers exiting the industry. This in 
turn could have negative long term consequences for the buyer. Another side of this 
argument is that wholesalers have made large investments that are ultimately sunk costs, 
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and as a result, wholesalers are reliant on producers as their suppliers of raw material that 
is of consistent quality and volume.  
Other factors include the fact that wholesalers are limited by geography in terms 
of sourcing cattle supplies. Attempting to extract rents is only a short run profit 
maximization strategy, but in the long run, it is not optimal. Likewise if markets are well 
integrated over space, this strategy of paying lower prices for livestock may be 
inconsistent with long run profit maximization. Producers who are already almost 
indifferent between delivering animals to the wholesaler attempting to extract rents and 
another wholesaler will then choose to deliver to the other wholesaler. Consequently it 
could be challenging for a wholesaler to set a price for live animals to extract oligopsony 
rents.  
CSS point to other characteristics of how wholesalers will interact with producers, 
such as preferring to use contracts and vertical integration. The motivation to use fewer 
producers to meet their needs is driven by efforts to minimize transaction costs, while 
offering a price for live cattle that allows producers to remain viable to ensure a stable 
supply of raw material to process. Paying this price is recognizing the presence of a 
symbiotic relationship, i.e. both wholesalers and producers depend on one another to be 
successful. 
This may be the case in the long term -- but CSS recognize time inconsistency 
issues, where wholesalers may be unable to pay a price to ensure one’s suppliers remain 
viable. If, for example, a wholesaler is experiencing financial difficulties short term 
survival may become more important. In such a situation a wholesaler may be unable to 
provide the producer a profitable rate of return for their output (Crespi, Saitone, & 
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Sexton, 2012). Henderson describes how such incidences of changes in output demand or 
input supply can play a role in determining how firms interact in the market at different 
points in time (Henderson, 2001).  
3.1 Costs 
To apply CSS’ model requires knowledge of actual cost levels or expenditure on 
items such as energy, labor etc. While it is possible to obtain variable costs of production 
at the producer level, information on costs at the wholesale level is not freely available in 
terms of the types of costs and usage as was noted by other researchers (Henderson, 
2001). Attempts have been made to obtain estimates of wholesaler costs, using empirical 
techniques to get marginal processing cost estimates. For example, Deuwer and Nelson 
developed cost estimates for simulated plants to investigate potential cost structures for 
meat wholesalers (Deuwer & Nelson, 1991). These techniques typically include items 
such as the input whose price is available (the purchase price of the animal and then other 
non-agricultural inputs which would include items such as energy, labor etc). In a model 
used by Cai, Stiegert & Koontz (CSK), a Leontief cost function was used to estimate 
processing costs using weekly data and costs included energy and labor. The Leontief 
cost function was used due to the fact of there being limited substitution between fed 
cattle and other inputs (Cai, Stiegert, & Koontz, 2009). The USDA publishes a daily 
Carcass Equivalent Index report which provides an estimate of processing costs for beef 
wholesalers on a carcass basis per hundredweight (cwt) and a slaughtering cost per head 
estimate. Looking at this data for the last 10 years reveals that there was not much 
fluctuation in these estimates. It was suggested by the USDA that these estimates do not 
fully reflect beef wholesaler margins and should be used as a comparative tool. 
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In Henderson’s research on the hog market, he argues that wholesalers may have 
the power to control the price of raw material (live cattle) and have little or no control 
over the cost of the other input or inputs (Henderson, 2001). However without knowledge 
of the actual level of usage of non-specialized inputs such as electricity and human labor, 
it remains quite challenging to estimate wholesaler costs accurately. Therefore, the 
analysis in this research relies on margins or price spreads between producers and 
wholesalers and between wholesalers and retailers. These margins are described as being 
a function of other variables, such as the per unit price of electricity.  
𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖𝑡, 𝑝𝑤𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑐𝑖𝑡) = (𝑝𝑤𝑡 − 𝑝𝑖𝑡)(𝑦𝑖𝑡) − 𝑐𝑖𝑡       (3.1) 
Where pit is the price the ith firm pays for live cattle at time t, pwt is the wholesale 
price of beef, yit represents the quantity of beef the ith firm produces from live cattle and 
then cit is the variable processing cost for the ith firm which is a function of non-cattle 
input prices. Other researchers have focused on margins, and how margins in the supply 
chain may change due to different factors such as the cost of marketing inputs such as 
labor, energy and transportation costs (Wohlgenant & Mullen, 1987).  
3.2 Mark up Pricing Hypothesis vs Relative Price Spread Model 
Wohlgenant and Mullen specify different market behavior equations to test to see 
which equation had the best empirical performance. The mark up hypothesis suggests 
that the farm gate, wholesale or retail prices in this case are determined by adding a mark 
up to the marginal cost of producing beef which is independent of current demand 
conditions. Williamson criticizes this hypothesis, because it completely ignores demand 
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conditions by simply increasing the price of output when input prices or the cost of 
production increases, does not necessarily agree with micro theory (Williamson, 1967).  
A mark up, can be shown as being equal to the sale price minus cost so the mark 
up on a product for a retailer can be shown in equation (3.2): 
𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖𝑡     (3.2) 
Where Bit is the mark up on product i at time t which can be in absolute or 
percentage form, is equal to the retail price of product i at time t minus the costs 
attributed to this product for the same period. 
The relative price spread model in Wohlgenant and Mullen’s paper includes the 
retail price, quantity and an index of costs, while the mark up price model did not include 
the quantity of output. They argue that the relative price spread model performs 
empirically better because it includes both the retail price and quantity. Hence the relative 
price spread model is deemed to be able to capture changes in demand and supply, which 
the mark up pricing model is not able to do as effectively (Wohlgenant & Mullen, 1987). 
Gardner concludes that no markup can show the price spread between retail and farm 
gate prices, due to the fact that retail and farm gate prices move in different ways 
depending on changes in demand for beef or the supply of inputs (Gardner, 1975). Capps, 
Byrne and Williams describe how increases in output at the producer level and increases 
in marketing costs would be expected to increase the farm to retail price spread according 
to neoclassical theory (Capps, Byrne, & Williams, 1995). 
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3.3 Data Collection 
The data is collected monthly for the period commencing in May 2004 through 
December 2011 with a total of 92 observations. All price data used in the analysis are 
deflated using a Consumer Price Index for the meat industry, which was obtained from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Prices for beef at the start of this data collection process 
are low, which can be explained in part due to the discovery of BSE (Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy) in the US a few months earlier.  
3.4 Producer Wholesaler Margin 
In any market, the price for a product or service can be described as being a 
function of market forces. These market forces can effect supply or demand or both and 
can have a negative or positive effect on the price for this product or service. In this 
section, margins are described and then estimated in the analysis to test how market 
forces can influence marketing margins in the U.S. beef industry. Lyon and Thompson 
describe a margin in a competitive market as the difference between the price paid by 
consumers or customers and the price received by producers or other intermediaries i.e. 
wholesalers. Alternatively, Lyon and Thompson describe the margin as the price for a 
bundle of marketing services (Lyon & Thompson, 1993). These margins are related to 
retailer, producer and input prices which may be used in transforming such products or 






Armah recalls Wohlgenants work in this area, where for a profit maximizing firm 
in a perfectly competitive environment, the margin between firms in a supply chain will 
be equal to the marginal cost as shown in equation (3.3) (Armah, 2012): 
        𝑀 = 𝑀𝐶(𝑄, 𝐶)        (3.3) 
M is the margin between for example, producers and wholesalers, Q is the 
quantity of beef product processed, C is the marketing costs incurred and lastly MC is the 
marginal cost for the provision of marketing services. The producer wholesaler margin is 
the difference between the farm gate price of beef and the wholesale price of beef. This 
margin or price spread between producers and wholesalers is defined by Wohlgenant and 
Mullen as being a function of other variables as shown in equation (3.4) (Wohlgenant & 
Mullen, 1987): 
                                               𝑃𝑤 − 𝑃𝑓 = 𝑀𝑤𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑄𝑐𝑡 , 𝐶𝑤𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡)         (3.4) 
Where Pw is the wholesale price of beef and Pf is the farm gate price of beef gives 
the margin between producers and wholesalers denoted by Mwt. This margin is a function 
of the quantity of output (cattle) at time t (Qct), marketing input prices (Cwt), such as 
energy expenses, and other exogenous variables (Xit) that can affect beef margins 
between industry participants, such as the price of substitutes are included. The same 
equation can be applied to the margin or price spread that exists between the wholesale 
and the retail price of beef. Likewise this margin can be described as a function of 
marketing input prices and the quantity supplied at time t and other exogenous variables 
as in equation (3.5). Where Pr and Pw are the prices for beef at the retail and wholesale 
level respectively to give the margin at time t (Mrt). This is then a function of the supply 
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of beef at time t, marketing inputs for the retailer and other exogenous variables denoted 
by (Xit): 
                                                        𝑃𝑟 − 𝑃𝑤 = 𝑀𝑟𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑄𝑏𝑡 , 𝐶𝑟𝑡, 𝑋𝑖𝑡)     (3.5) 
Wohlgenant and Mullen propose that specifying the equation as in (3.5) suggests 
that the relationship or margin between retail and wholesale prices is not fixed by some 
amount or percentage (Wohlgenant & Mullen, 1987). This margin can be subject to 
changes as a result of output, input prices or other variables that change as conditions in 
the marketplace change. This suggests that the bargaining power of producers, 
wholesalers and retailers can shift to some degree over time, due to changes in the 
market. A situation in which beef production increases at a faster pace than demand could 
result in the price spread between producers and wholesalers or between wholesalers and 
retailers increasing, for example. Where beef is in plentiful supply, wholesalers/retailers 
could purchase this output from their upstream suppliers for a lower price. Similarly, if 
production declined as is seen in the current cattle cycle one would expect the price 
spread to contract. Specifying margins to be a function of marketing costs and the 
quantity supplied implies that retail prices determine wholesale prices, which in turn 
determine farm gate prices. 
Margins between producers and wholesalers were collected for four different 
procurement arrangements which are described below. These prices were then divided by 
0.615 which was used by CSK in their analysis of the beef industry to convert live cattle 
prices to a carcass equivalent price (Cai, Stiegert, & Koontz, 2011). This carcass 
equivalent price is then subtracted from the wholesale price for beef, during the same 
period to calculate the producer wholesaler margins for each period. 
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Monthly slaughter data is provided by the Livestock Marketing Information 
Center (LMIC) along with the quantity of beef produced each month. The price 
wholesalers receive for output is defined as wholesale beef prices which were again 
obtained from the LMIC’s website using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
Producer prices were obtained from the USDA’s data-mart site 
http://mpr.datamart.ams.usda.gov/. All of the prices reported by the USDA are reported 
in compliance with the Mandatory Price Reporting legislation and a weighted average of 
these prices are used in the analysis. Four different prices are used for live cattle which 
are Forward Contract Net, Formula Contract Net, Negotiated Grid Net and Negotiated 
Cash. 
These four different producer prices are used to estimate the margin between 
producers and wholesalers. The use of different contract prices are used to act as a point 
of differentiation for the share of the wholesale price producers might earn under 
different contractual arrangements with wholesalers.  
1. Forward Contract Net: The base price is based off the CME, or some other 
comparable publicly available price that is available for months in advance. This 
base price is normally a moving target that the producer has the option to lock in 
at some point during the life of the contract. A forward contract may also be a 
firm cash price with delivery in excess of 14 days. The final net price paid to the 
producer is determined at delivery if there are no possible adjustments in the 




2. Negotiated Cash: Cash price negotiated between buyer and seller where the price 
is known at the time the deal is struck and will not change regardless of how the 
cattle perform. All that is needed for payment is a weight. Slaughter is expected 
within 14 days, and usually within 7 days. 
3. Negotiated Grid Net: The base price is negotiated between buyer and seller and 
is known at the time the deal is struck and delivery is expected within 14 days. 
However, the final net price paid to the producer will be determined by applying a 
grid of premiums and discounts after slaughter based on carcass performance. 
These premiums and discounts may be applied for things like age of the animal, 
heavy carcass etc. 
4.    Formula Contract Net: The base price is not negotiated but is based on some 
other price (such as plant average or weighted average price) or value determining 
mechanism that may or may not be known at the time the deal is struck. The 
original purchase arrangement may be made from days to months ahead of 
slaughter. The final net price paid to the producer is determined after application 
of premiums and discounts. Like the negotiated grid contracts these premiums or 
discounts may be based on the age or weight of the animal. The producer 





Figure 3.1. Deflated Producer Wholesaler Margins. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that the margins generally display the same pattern across 
different procurement methods. The margin on the forward contract net appears to have 
more volatility associated with it in terms of the maximum and minimum margin under 
this price arrangement. The margin on forward contract net appears to display larger 
extremes compared to the other margins which could be due to its link with the futures 
market. This margin has the smallest margin some periods by almost $20 per cwt. This 
could be due to the greater pricing flexibility producers may have under such a contract, 
as they may be able to lock in more preferable prices for livestock, if the market works in 
their favor. Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics for the different margins under the 
different contractual arrangements. It is apparent that the margin on the forward contract 
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by the coefficient of variation for the margin on forward contract net which is at least 
four percent larger compared to the volatility associated with the other producer 
wholesaler margins.  
 Table 3.1. Summary Statistics for the Producer Wholesaler Margins. 
 
 
3.5 The Wholesaler Retailer margin 
The wholesaler retailer margin is defined as the difference between the wholesale 
and the retail price of beef. This margin is then described as a function of other variables, 
which are investigated to determine how they potentially could affect the margin between 
wholesalers and retailers. 
Wholesale prices by cut were obtained from the USDA’s weekly report 
(“National Weekly Boxed Beef Cutout and Boxed Beef Cuts – Negotiated Sales” report 
LM_XB459). A weighted average over several wholesale cuts which could be sold as 
chuck roast, round roast, steak round or sirloin steak and chuck steak (to be used for 
chuck ground beef), were calculated for each month to convert these prices from weekly 
to monthly prices. Ground chuck is used in the analysis as chuck ground beef -- as this is 












Mean 0.4182 0.4181 0.4369 0.4252
Standard Deviation 0.0424 0.0595 0.0421 0.0404
Coefficient of Variation 0.1015 0.1424 0.0963 0.0950
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sirloin steak. This may be especially true in more recent times where the price of beef has 
achieved record highs which is said to have an effect on consumers’ allocation of money 
for food -- for example, some consumers are said to be switching to less expensive meat 
products (Gee, Berry, & Thacker, 2013). Another reason for the selection of the margin 
on ground chuck is that compared to ground beef it becomes less clear what cut or type of 
beef is in this product, ground chuck typically consists of chuck steak. Retail prices for 
each beef cut used, were taken from the BLS’s website. 
  
Figure 3.2. Deflated Wholesaler Retailer Margins 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the deflated margin for the five different cuts of beef between 
wholesalers and retailers estimated in this research. As expected, we see that sirloin steak 
(a higher quality cut) has a higher margin between wholesalers and retailers. For chuck 
ground beef it is obvious that out of the five cuts this has the lowest margin, which, again, 
is expected. This margin on chuck ground beef has remained relatively constant in real 
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terms with a range of approximately between $0.50 and $0.80 dollars per pound (lb). For 
the other three cuts the margins are more similar and for the most part, follow the same 
pattern over the period being analyzed.  
The summary statistics in Table 3.2 suggest that the Margin on Sirloin Steak has 
the largest volatility, with a coefficient of variation of 0.1277, while the Margin on Steak 
Round has the lowest volatility with a coefficient of variation value of 0.0741. 
 
Table 3.2. Summary Statistics for the Wholesaler Retailer Margins 
 
 
3.6 Explanatory Variables Used in the Margin Equations 
3.6.1 Marketing Costs 
It is expected that as a firm’s costs increase there are two alternatives the firm can 
incur some or all of the cost itself. Alternatively, this increase in costs can be passed on to 
consumers in the form of higher prices or, to upstream firms in the form of lower prices 
for inputs. The latter would be expected to occur at least some of the time, as if firms 
















Mean 0.9863 1.2149 1.0739 1.7486 0.6796
Standard Deviation 0.0989 0.0901 0.0871 0.2233 0.0789
Coefficient of variation 0.1003 0.0741 0.0811 0.1277 0.1161
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costs are expected to have an influence on margins in the beef supply chain. The principle 
costs after the cost for purchasing live cattle are expected to be energy and labor costs.  
Data is collected for labor, electricity and diesel prices as a proxy for 
transportation costs. For labor costs monthly data was collected from the BLS’s website 
for the same period (May 2004 to December 2011).  
 With respect to labor it is assumed that if workers become more productive or 
efficient, labor costs for a firm could decrease even though the wage cost per hour might 
increase. To capture this effect, labor expenses are calculated as the ratio of monthly 
industry wages divided by industry output. In the producer wholesaler margins this is 
calculated as the labor cost per hour times the number of hours worked on average per 
week times 4.3 weeks times the number of workers in animal processing businesses 
divided by the industry output in pounds. The data concerning hourly wages average 
hours worked and the number of workers in processing businesses are obtained from the 
BLS’s site. A similar calculation is used for retailer labor expenses used in wholesaler 
retailer margins with the grocery store labor data obtained from the BLS, which is then 
divided by monthly sales reported by the US Census Bureau. 
For energy, the retail price of electricity sold to industry was collected from the 
Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) website which is used in the producer - 
wholesaler margin equations. The commercial price of electricity was obtained from the 
same website, and is used in the wholesaler retailer margins. Electricity price data is 
reported in cents/ kilowatt hour. The price of No.2 diesel fuel is used as a proxy for 
transportation costs, because this type of fuel is used by most trucks and is reported in 
dollars/gallon.   
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The price of No.2 diesel fuel is used in the wholesaler retailer margin equation. 
Transportation costs between producers and wholesalers are assumed to be incurred by 
the producer. For example, prices reported by the USDA reveal that most of the time, the 
Free On Board price was less than the delivered price. This suggests that while 
wholesalers may own the transport or hire the transport company, it is the producers who 
are paying for this cost. For the wholesaler retailer margins, it is less clear which industry 
participants actually pay for transport and who pays for an increase in transportation 
expenses. This ambiguity comes from the fact that wholesalers may pay for 
transportation costs to a retailer’s distribution center only, or wholesalers may be 
shipping product directly to a retailer’s store, and may be responsible for transportation 
costs, especially when the retailer does not actually take ownership of the product. 
3.6.2 Four-Firm Concentration Ratios 
One of the most important motivating factors for studying highly concentrated 
industries, and how firms compete, is the question of other downstream or upstream firms 
having market power. The reason for these concerns are related to the perceived issue of 
a lack of competition as industries become consolidated over time, resulting in only a 
small number of participants remaining. The US beef industry is no exception to these 
concerns, and has received a significant amount of attention from researchers as a result. 
There is, however, no actual monthly four-firm concentration ratio reported for meat 
wholesalers or retailers. In Marsh and Brester’s analysis, four-firm concentration ratios 
were only reported in five year intervals. To address this issue, they use a linear 
interpolation technique to fill in the gaps (Marsh & Brester, 2004). Today, the Grain 
Inspection Packers and Stockyards Association report an annual four-firm concentration 
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ratio for meat wholesalers in the steer and heifer market. To convert this to a monthly 
measure, linear interpolation is used to get a monthly four-firm concentration ratio.  
A positive result for wholesaler concentration in the producer wholesaler margins, 
would suggest that wholesalers may have market power in the market for live cattle and 
could pay lower prices as a result. A negative coefficient for the wholesaler retailer 
equation would suggest that wholesalers have market power in the wholesale market for 
beef and could charge higher prices for beef than what would be charged under perfectly 
competitive conditions. 
For retailers in the US, the four-firm concentration ratio is known to vary by 
different regions. The top four retailers that have the highest market share is also known 
to vary by region. At the national level the USDA publishes a four-firm concentration 
ratio for retailers, and in 2012, the four retailers with the largest market share were 
Walmart, Kroger, Safeway and Publix. Prior to 2011, Supervalu was the fourth largest 
retailer, before it sold approximately 1900 outlets (ERS, 2014a). A positive coefficient 
for retailer concentration indicates that an increase in concentration in the retail sector is 
associated with an increase in wholesaler retailer margins, and this suggests that food 
retailers obtain more pricing power as the retail sector becomes more concentrated. If the 
coefficient for retailer concentration is found to be negative, this would lend support to 
the argument that increases in retailer concentration results in economies of scale being 
achieved, which may be passed on to wholesalers through paying higher prices for beef.  
3.6.3 Cold Storage  
Henderson uses cold storage per capita as a proxy for capacity constraints under 
the assumption that cold storage for pork is correlated with population levels (Henderson, 
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2001). When cold storage of beef increases, one would expect that the demand for live 
cattle by wholesalers will decline, as there is an increase in the quantity of already 
processed beef ready to be supplied to markets. If there is an increase in cold storage 
stocks of beef to meet demand, this could give rise to wholesalers having greater 
potential to collude in live cattle markets. In Henderson’s results, however, using cold 
storage as a capacity utilization measure was found to be insignificant in terms of its 
effect on competition in the market for live hogs. Cold storage in this analysis is 
measured as the quantity of beef in cold storage per capita, to test for its effect on 
margins. A negative coefficient for cold storage on margins between wholesalers and 
retailers may arise from wholesalers charging a higher price to cover the increased costs 
of storing this product. For the producer wholesaler margins, it is expected that if there is 
an increase in cold storage quantities, wholesalers would have a lower demand for live 
cattle and a reduction in cattle prices may occur.  
3.6.4 Substitutes  
Another factor to consider is that beef must compete with other products which 
can act as substitutes. If the consumer perceives that beef has become too expensive or 
that the utility one may get from a steak does not justify the increased price, then 
consumers might increase their consumption of pork or other less expensive meat 
products. The use of substitute variables have been used in similar research analyzing 
margins in agricultural product markets (Marsh & Brester, 2004) and (Armah, 2012). 
3.6.5 Disposable Income 
Disposable income is measured by the US Federal Reserve and is reported as real 
per capita disposable income. A negative relationship between this variable and margins 
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would suggest that when consumers’ incomes increase causes more beef to be demanded 
and hence increases the price of beef. Alternatively, disposable income may have a 
positive relationship with margins which would suggest that as consumers’ incomes 
increase could result in a greater demand for marketing services. Marsh and Brester 
included a per capita consumption expenditure variable in their analysis of margins in the 
pork industry (Marsh & Brester, 2004).  
3.6.6 Productivity  
Firms seeking improvements in productivity/efficiency gains is said to be one of 
the motivating factors that has stimulated consolidation in industries such as meat 
processing. If firms become more productive or efficient it will likely translate into lower 
costs per unit or, lower labor costs if a firm’s workers become more productive. To 
maintain their competitive position or improve market share wholesalers might pass this 
cost saving on to retailers, in the form of lower prices for beef. Alternatively, wholesalers 
might pass on cost savings to producers, by paying a higher price for live cattle. For 
wholesalers an industrial productivity index is used for animal slaughtering businesses.  
3.6.7 Aggregate Supply/Anticipated Supply Boom and Firm Conduct 
How wholesalers interact in the marketplace in buying inputs (live animals) and 
selling output (meat product) is expected to change over time as supply and demand for 
live cattle changes. Past investigations in this area have sought to explain and detect 
incidences of price wars when firms may compete more aggressively. A price war might 
occur when wholesalers pay higher prices for inputs or selling output at discounted prices 
to obtain or maintain market share (Koontz, Garcia, & Hudson, 1993). Alternatively, 
collusive behavior may be detected when the opposite holds and firms compete less 
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aggressively in the market place and may cooperate for their own mutual benefit through 
the formation of a cartel. Stigler identifies enforcement as a major problem associated 
with cartels. He argues that for a cartel to establish itself and survive, requires that firms 
part of the cartel must not deviate from agreed upon prices. If a firm deviates from agreed 
prices, it could result in that particular firm being punished or collapse of the cartel, as 
firms decide not to cooperate and compete more aggressively in their respective markets 
(Stigler, 1964). The aforementioned agreed prices may not necessarily be prices 
colluding wholesalers sit down and agree to formally but, could arise from a tacit or 
implied agreement. Green and Porter reference Stigler’s work, arguing that the detection 
of “secret price cutting” (in an oligopsony case this would take the form of paying secret 
price premiums) is the greatest obstacle for collusive behavior to be sustainable in an 
industry (Green & Porter, 1984). 
Rotemberg and Saloner develop a model to explain how prices vary or, in other 
words, how oligopolies respond to changes in demand. They argue that when demand 
and output prices are relatively high, a firm in such a market could be motivated to 
undercut the competitor’s price in an effort to maximize profits. Their reasoning is that if 
a firm does undercut the competition by a small amount, that particular firm can capture a 
larger share of the market in the short term. A firm may be motivated to behave in this 
manner when it anticipates that prices will decline due to a future reduction in demand. 
Under such a scenario, it is likely that the firm may experience some form of punishment 
in their market from competitors if they are caught. However, the severity of the 
punishment may be less than the perceived benefit from colluding during a demand boom 
when prices are high (Rotemberg & Saloner, 1986).  
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Ellison interpreted Rotemberg and Saloner’s theory as one of countercyclical 
pricing with anticipated demand. In times when current demand is higher relative to 
demand in the future, firms will choose to engage in price cutting. The incentive to cut 
prices is diminished when the price of output decreases. Secondly Ellison identifies that 
price cutting may be more challenging to detect during boom periods, when prices are 
increasing as some firms may potentially be increasing prices by smaller amounts than 
other industry participants (Ellison, 1994). 
Henderson used the above theory outlined by Ellison (1994) and Rotemberg and 
Saloner (1986) to describe firm conduct in the US pork industry, under both oligopoly 
and oligopsony settings. The effect of an anticipated aggregate supply boom was 
investigated to see if this supply boom caused prices for live hogs to increase as 
wholesalers compete amongst each other for supplies of hogs (Henderson, 2001). 
Rotemberg and Saloner’s theory suggests that during anticipated supply booms, 
competitive action increases. During a supply boom with low input prices, this would 
suggest that firms have an incentive to maintain live cattle prices closer to the 
competitive price. Under this theory, wholesalers would have an incentive to not reduce 
the price of live cattle aggressively to acquire market share. An anticipated supply boom 
is denoted by SB. A negative relationship between SB and the producer wholesaler 
margin would support Rotemberg and Saloner’s theory that competition is more intense 
during periods of anticipated supply booms. 
Using Rotemberg and Saloner’s theory, if there is a negative relationship between 
margins and this variable would indicate that wholesalers may behave more 
competitively during an anticipated cattle supply boom, to increase market share and the 
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wholesaler’s profits. Periods where an anticipated supply boom occurs are defined as 
periods in which the supply of cattle is lower in both the previous and following periods. 
Henderson estimates this anticipated demand for the hog industry, by calculating the ratio 
of current slaughter divided by the average of the forecasted slaughter for the next two 
periods following the current period (Henderson, 2001). Actual slaughter forecast data is 
provided by the USDA at the quarterly level in the Livestock, Dairy and Poultry Outlook 
reports. However, the USDA also publishes a monthly Cattle on Feed Report, which 
gives information on the number of cattle placed in feedlots. This would suggest that 
industry participants have perfect information with respect to how many animals could be 
ready or available for slaughter at some point in the near future. Upon entering a feedlot 
cattle can spend anything from 90 to 300 days in a feedlot with the average time spent in 
a feedlot being approximately 140 days (USDA, 2013a).  
Assuming cattle placed in feedlots in January will be scheduled, or go for 
slaughter, sometime in May (i.e. four months later) a potential supply boom could be 
expected when the cattle placements in the months prior to and after January are less on 
average than the cattle placements in January. It is possible that cattle may spend more 
than four months in a feedlot, but feedlots are assumed to behave as profit maximizers 
and similar to wholesalers, they strive to maximize throughput. It is assumed that cattle 
owners have limited opportunity to hold back cattle if cattle prices are low or that by 
waiting prices could improve, due to the fact that by holding the animals for extended 
periods is expensive and overweight or over-fat cattle could incur price penalties. 
For a wholesaler with such information, the supply boom variable for May is 
calculated as the ratio of the cattle placements number in January, divided by the average 
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of the cattle placements number in the previous and following three months. In this 
example, cattle placements in January would be divided by the average of cattle 
placements in October, November, December, February, March and April. Where a 
wholesaler has such information and where it would appear that supply over the next few 
months is expected to be lower, wholesalers could be expected to compete more 
aggressively for animals in May to capture market share. In an oligopsony or collusive 
setting wholesalers who compete more aggressively during a supply boom may receive 
punishment from other wholesalers. However, the wholesaler may be willing to accept 
this punishment in the following months where supply is expected to be less, and prices 
for live animals may be more expensive. In equation (3.6) an anticipated supply boom 
would be observed when the output is greater than one. This is explained in equation 
form below where Cp – 4 is the cattle placements number reported by the USDA four 
months ago:  
𝐶𝑝 − 4
(𝐶𝑝 − 7) + (𝐶𝑝 − 6) + (𝐶𝑝 − 5) + (𝐶𝑝 − 3) +
(𝐶𝑝 − 2) + (𝐶𝑃 − 1)]/6
    
= 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝑥 =   (𝑆𝐵)        (3.6) 
Before the above variable is estimated a regression equation is used to adjust 
cattle placement numbers for seasonality, as one would expect seasonality to be a factor. 
In an industry where a lot of calf births take place in the spring would result in one 
expecting this seasonality to result in the slaughter of cattle being somewhat seasonal too. 
To account for this seasonality, the cattle placements for each month is regressed on 12 
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dummy variables, where a value of one is given if the cattle placement number 
corresponds to month x and zero otherwise.  
    𝑍𝑡 =  ?̂?1𝐷1 + ?̂?2𝐷2 + ?̂?3𝐷3 + ?̂?4𝐷4 + ?̂?5𝐷5 + ?̂?6𝐷6 +  ?̂?7𝐷7 + ?̂?8𝐷8 + ?̂?9𝐷9 + ?̂?10𝐷10
+ ?̂?11𝐷11 + ?̂?12𝐷12                              (3.7)                                
The predicted values from the above regression are used to adjust for at least 
some of the seasonality in cattle placements. These predicted values for each month are 
used in equation (3.6) to calculate the anticipated supply boom measure. A supply boom 
for a particular month is defined as having a value of greater than one. That is, it is 
expected that in three months before and after month “x” the supply of live cattle to 
wholesalers will on average be less than the supply of live cattle in month “x”. 
3.6.8 The Role Capacity Constraints/ Excess Capacity 
The meat wholesaling industry is characterized as having a high fixed cost 
structure and thus is a capital intensive business. For firms to succeed in an industry 
capacity utilization and maintaining throughput are important considerations. Some 
recent examples in the US meat industry include the closure of Tyson’s poultry plant in 
Jackson Mississippi and, more recently, the news of Cargill’s decision to close its 
Plainview plant in Texas, which industry commentators attributed to excess capacity 
(Hawkes, 2013). 
One would expect that if there is a shortage of live cattle this would result in 
wholesalers potentially having excess capacity. When there is a shortage of live cattle 
wholesalers might compete more aggressively by paying a higher price to obtain live 
cattle ultimately resulting in producers getting a larger percentage of the wholesale price. 
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The actual price spread or margin in this case between producers and wholesalers would 
decline. Haskel and Martin identify that capacity constraints have an impact on firms’ 
marginal cost curves and thus have an impact on the nature of competition in the 
marketplace for a homogenous good. They show that in an oligopoly model, capacity 
constraints place upward pressure on a firm’s marginal cost function (Haskel & Martin, 
1994). 
 
Figure 3.3. Effect of Capacity Constraints. 
 
The implications of a capacity constraint for wholesalers may be shown in Figure 
3.3, where firms face an upward sloping marginal cost function with no capacity 
constraints they will demand Q* of live cattle. However, where there is a capacity 
constraint a firm will demand Qc. For such a firm, the marginal cost function changes 
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from one with a slope of less than one, to a marginal cost function that becomes vertical 
when this capacity constraint becomes binding.  
The implication is that wholesalers will require less cattle under a scenario if 
capacity constraints are binding, than would be the case if capacity is not an issue. The 
effect of a capacity binding constraint could put downward pressure on cattle prices, and 
wholesalers do not have to compete as aggressively to source cattle. In other words, there 
is a markdown of cattle prices during periods when capacity is fully utilized and there is a 
plentiful supply of live cattle. 
If capacity constraints are not binding or there is excess capacity, wholesalers’ 
demand for cattle may increase. Subsequently, wholesalers would be expected to 
compete more aggressively by bidding up prices to maintain throughput and to reduce the 
level of unused capacity. This theory is consistent with Haskel and Martin’s finding that 
there is a positive relationship between capacity constraints and profits in a concentrated 
industry (Haskel & Martin, 1994).   
There is, however, a situation that may exist where a wholesaler may not be in a 
position to pay more to producers to obtain live cattle as wholesalers may be unable to 
earn a return above variable costs. Under such a scenario the wholesaler may decide to 
bear the cost of the under-utilized capacity or may pay a premium to source animals to 
fulfil contractual obligations. 
Capacity can also play a strategic role in acting as a barrier to prevent new 
entrants entering the market. Spence proposes that an industry might carry excess 
capacity to deter entry, a strategy achieved by a firm having the ability to expand output 
during a period where new entrants may enter the market. The result of which causes the 
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market to be flooded with product and depresses prices for all parties, with the 
implication that profits for at least the new entrant will be negative (Spence, 1977). The 
existing/established firms may be able to temporarily weather the effects of low prices 
and may even still earn a return above variable costs, as the established firms might have 
a lower cost base than the new entrant (Spence, 1977). In the meat wholesaling industry, 
the evidence suggests that new entrants entering the market is somewhat rare, which in 
turn suggests that the mere threat could be sufficient to reduce the incentive for potential 
new entrants. This theory is consistent with the phenomenon Spence describes: to deter 
entry, investments need to be irreversible (Spence, 1977). For a homogenous industry 
like beef this can be achieved through investing in capacity prior to any such threat of 
new entry emerging and thus makes it a credible threat to potential new entrants. The 
threat to the new entrants in this case could be twofold: not only may the new entrants 
experience negative margins, but if these new entrants fail to succeed, they have a plant 
with limited substitution possibilities or alternative uses.  
Lieberman suggests that where there may be variability/demand is uncertain the 
role of excess capacity as an entry barrier is reduced, although where there is little or no 
uncertainty concerning demand, excess capacity can have a role to maintain collusive 
activity (Lieberman, 1987). As a result of this excess capacity, a firm can increase 
production and cause the price of output to reduce as a result of the increased supply. 
Such behavior may be driven by attempts to punish existing industry participants who 
may have been found to deviate from the collusive arrangement. For firms that do deviate 
they can only be subject to such punishment where there is excess capacity present 
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(Lieberman, 1987). This relies on the assumption that firms who are to hand out 
punishments on those who deviate have the following capabilities: 
- Perfect information with respect to demand. 
- Be able to identify those who are not abiding by the collusive agreement. 
- The ability to determine whether or not excess capacity is present (Haskel & Martin 
1994). 
Where firms have imperfect information concerning demand, for example, if 
demand increases unexpectedly can cause capacity constraints to become binding and 
reduce the level of competition amongst firms. Under this scenario, firms might revert 
back to collusion in this case as the ability to expand output is reduced and profits under 
collusion would be expected to be greater as excess capacity becomes insignificant. One 
last point noted by Lieberman is that the presence of excess capacity in an industry does 
not in itself deter entry. He points to a number of examples where new entrants entered a 
market with excess capacity while those markets were growing (Lieberman, 1987). When 
we contrast this to the US beef industry we would expect market growth to be relatively 
small and possibly negative from time to time. This would be consistent with the 
hypothesis that excess capacity in the meat industry could potentially deter entry due to 
the limited growth opportunities in an industry highly concentrated. 
Theoretically, if there is excess capacity, a negative relationship would be 
expected between the producer wholesaler margins. If it is possible to earn a return above 
variable costs, it is expected that wholesalers will pay more to source live cattle in an 
effort to increase the utilization of their plant and equipment.  
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The Federal Reserve estimates a capacity utilization measure which is based on 
throughput in a base period for different industries and is shown in figure 3.4. The 
measure used here is capacity utilization for NAICS code 311 (the food manufacturing 
sector). This covers a broad industry including other meat and vegetable manufacturing 
businesses. As a result, this measure may not be fully representative of the actual capacity 
utilization of the beef wholesaling industry, because the beef industry may face some 
challenges/issues that may be different from those involved in other food manufacturing 
businesses. However, it does suggest that there could potentially be at least some excess 
capacity in the U.S. beef industry. The true extent of capacity utilization or if there is 
significant excess capacity cannot be accurately determined.  
 
Figure 3.4. Capacity Utilization for the Food Manufacturing Sector. 
 
Excess capacity may be present to deter new entrants as highlighted by some of 
the theories mentioned earlier. Wholesalers might be willing to tolerate some excess 
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capacity are lumpy and firms add extra capacity under the assumption that they will be 
able to expand output in the future. If there is excess capacity greater than what the 
firm/industry might be willing to tolerate, could result in the wholesaler deciding to 
compete more aggressively to source animals or decide to discontinue production on a 
temporary or permanent basis. 
The capacity utilization index reported by the Federal Reserve is used here. It is 
expected that where wholesalers find it challenging to source live animals, and can earn a 
return above variable costs at the same time by paying a higher price to producers to 
attract supplies, will result in the coefficient being negative for this variable. 
3.6.9 Imports and Exports 
Import and export data was obtained from the USDA and the US Meat Export 
Federation (USMEF) to test for the effect of imports and exports on margins between 
producers and wholesalers, and wholesalers and retailers. Beef and veal imports per 
capita, and beef exports per capita are used in the wholesaler retailer margin analysis. 
Lopez and Lopez outline how imports have an effect on domestic producers, 
arguing that when imports increase, the impact on domestic producers is negative 
because it reduces the margins for these domestic producers. Under some conditions, 
however, imports may have a positive impact. They find that in the meat wholesaling 
industry, imports discipline the domestic industry by reducing price cost margins, where 
an increase in imports of meat would result in a decrease in the price and demand for the 
domestically produced meat. They also find that in industries that are characterized as 
oligopolies, an increase in imports will decrease price cost margins more efficiently 
compared to industries not as concentrated, while the effect may be positive for industries 
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where diseconomies of scale or products have low elasticities of demand (Lopez & 
Lopez, 2003). 
Peel discusses the reasons why the US both imports and exports beef. This fact is 
initially counterintuitive, as according to Peel the US is the largest consumer, producer, 
importer and third largest exporter of beef in the world (Peel, 2010). The above statement 
could certainly make one question the need for the US to be importing and exporting 
such large quantities. Peel explains that the processing of an animal results in a number of 
different products, with different attributes. These products may not match the 
preferences of US consumers (where demand largely consists of ground beef and steaks). 
In other countries the products demanded by consumers may differ. Therefore, partaking 
in trade allows wholesalers and retailers to deliver exactly what consumers want. As a 
result, industry participants can obtain the highest price for beef by selling products to 
consumers, who value these products most (Peel, 2010). 
Citing this evidence, Peel argues that exports of beef are important to adjust the 
product mix to meet the demands of the domestic market. To this end, exports are said to 
consist of select products, like chucks and rounds, to countries like Mexico (Peel, 2010). 
Other examples include countries like Peru, which place a high value on hearts, while in 
the US the demand for hearts is low (Andrews, 2013). Similarly, Japan places a high 
value on beef tongues, which are more commonly known as part of the fifth quarter. This 
product is known to demand a price premium of almost $6 per pound compared to what 
US consumers are willing to pay for beef tongues (Hubbard, 2013). 
According to the USDA ERS’s site, US imports of beef consist of mostly low 
value cuts such as those used for ground beef (ERS, 2014b). The US needs to import beef 
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because the fat content of domestically produced beef in the US being is too high. The 
beef that comes from US produced animals is not lean enough to make products like 
hamburgers, resulting in a need for the import of lean grass fed beef (Andrews, 2013).  
3.7 Producer Wholesale Margin Equations 
In Table 3.3 a description is provided of the dependent and independent variables 
used in the producer wholesaler margins with the symbol for each variable and the unit of 
measurement. 
Table 3.3. Dependent and Independent Variables in the Producer Wholesaler Margins. 
Symbol Variable Description Units 
MFC Margin on Formula Contract Net  $/lb 
MForwC Margin on Forward Contract Net  $/lb 
MNGN Margin on Negotiated Grid Net  $/lb 
MNC Margin on Negotiated Cash  $/lb 
Br Retail Price of Beef $/lb 
Electri Industrial Electricity Price  cents/kwh  
Lab/Q 
Industry labor expenses divided by quantity of beef 
produced per month ratio 
INDP Industrial Productivity Index for Meat Wholesalers Percentage 
CS Cold Storage Per Capita lbs/capita 
SB Supply Boom Index 
Dispinc Real Disposable Income Per Capita $/capita 
PPw Wholesale Price of Pork $/lb 
Util Capacity Utilization Index 




The margin between producers and wholesalers for a particular procurement 
method is denoted as Mct where c denotes the contract and t denotes the time period. 
Producer wholesaler margins are defined as being a function of cost variables namely 
labor (Lab/Qwt) electricity (Electriwt), where the subscript w denotes that these labor costs 
are for wholesalers and the electricity price is that charged to industry. Per capita 
disposable income, the supply boom measure and capacity utilization are denoted by 
Dispinct, SBt and Utilt respectively. Table 3.3 also includes a productivity index for meat 
wholesalers (INDPt), per capita cold storage quantities of beef (CSt), the four-firm 
concentration ratio for wholesalers (CR4t) and the wholesale price of pork (PPwt). The 
producer wholesaler margin for the four different contract methods can be shown as: 
Mct = f(Brt, Dispinct,, Lab/Qwt, Electriwt, INDPt, CSt, PPwt, SBt, Utilt, CR4t)  (3.10) 
From the above we can now derive the empirical equation used for producer 
wholesaler margins as: 
Mct = 𝛽0  +𝛽1Brt + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑤𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑤𝑡   + 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑡   + 𝛽6𝐶𝑆𝑡 +  










3.8 Wholesaler - Retailer Margin Equations 
Table 3.4 includes a description of the dependent and independent variables used 
in the wholesaler retailer margins with the symbol for each variable and the unit of 
measurement. 
Table 3.4. Dependent and Independent Variables in the Wholesaler Retailer Margins. 
Symbol Variable Description Units 
MCR Margin on Chuck Roast $/lb 
MRR Margin on Round Roast $/lb 
MSR Margin on Steak Round $/lb 
MSR Margin on Sirloin Steak $/lb 
MCGB Margin on Chuck Ground Beef $/lb 
CRr Retail Price of Chuck Roast $/lb 
RRr Retail Price of Round Roast $/lb 
SRr Retail Price of Steak Round $/lb 
SSr Retail Price of Sirloin Steak $/lb 
CGBr Retail Price of Chuck Ground Beef $/lb 
Electri Commercial Electricity Price cents/kwh 
Diesel Price of No.2 Diesel Fuel $/gallon 
Lab/Q 
Industry labor expenses divided by industry 
retail sales per month ratio 
$ 
INDP 
Industrial Productivity Index for Meat 
Wholesalers 
Index 
CS Cold Storage Per Capita lbs/capita 
Dispinc Real Disposable Income Per Capita $/capita 
PPr Retail Price of Pork $/lb 
CR4 Four-Firm Concentration Ratio for Wholesalers Index 
Ret CR4 Four-Firm Retail Concentration Ratio Index 
ExpB Exports of Beef lbs/capita 





The wholesaler retailer margin for the different cuts of meat is defined as a 
function of:  
Mit=f (Brit, Lab/Qrt ,Electrirt ,Dieselt, CSt, PPrt, Dispinct, CR4t, RetCR4t, INDPt, ImpBt, 
ExpBt)  (3.8) 
The margin is shown as Mit which is the wholesaler - retailer margin on cut i at 
time t. The different margins on different cuts are denoted as shown in Table 3.4, for 
example, MCR denotes the wholesaler retailer margin for chuck roast. The wholesaler - 
retailer margins are then a function of Brit the retail price of that particular cut of beef at 
time t. A price for a substitute is included as the retail price of pork at time t (PPrt). 
Retailer costs are represented by labor, energy and transportation costs, and are included 
as Lab/Qrt, Electrirt and Dieselt respectively. The subscript r denotes that wages are for 
retail workers and electricity prices are those reported for commercial enterprises. Cold 
storage quantities are shown by CSt. While INDPt is an index of productivity for the meat 
processing sector. Real disposable income per capita is reported by the Federal Reserve 
and is denoted by Dispinct. As mentioned above, concentration ratios were obtained for 
the four-firm concentration ratio for meat wholesalers and for retailers, which are denoted 
by CR4 for wholesalers and RetCR4 for retailers. Lastly, imports and exports of beef in 







From equation (3.8) we can now specify the margin equation that will be used in 
the analysis: 
Mit = 𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑎𝑏/𝑄𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑟𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑆𝑡 + 
𝛽6 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐶𝑅4𝑡 + 𝛽9 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝐶𝑅4𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽11 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽12 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝐵𝑡 + 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3.9) 
3.9 Correlation Matrices and Summary Statistics 
Before estimation is completed via regression analysis, the data in the above 
equations is tested to check for any issues there may be with correlation. Correlation 
matrices are calculated for the coefficients for each of the nine regressions and is reported 
in part C of the appendices. We can see from the correlation matrices of the coefficients, 
that none of the independent variables are perfectly correlated with each other i.e. there 
are no values of 1 or -1, which would indicate perfect correlation between two variables.  
Summary statistics including the mean, standard deviation and the coefficient of 
variation for each independent variable is reported below in Table 3.5 for the producer 











Table 3.5. Summary Statistics for the Independent Variables in the Producer Wholesaler 
Margins. 
 





Lab/Q 0.25 0.02 0.08 
INDP 98.64 3.73 0.04 
Br 2.14 0.05 0.02 
Electri 3.21 0.22 0.07 
CS 1.43 0.12 0.09 
SB 1.00 0.13 0.14 
PPw 64.92 6.10 0.09 
Util 79.97 1.12 0.01 
Cr4 80.94 1.87 0.02 


















CGBr 1.39 0.04 0.03 
CRr 1.79 0.09 0.05 
RRr 1.98 0.07 0.04 
SRr 2.12 0.08 0.04 
SSr 3.06 0.27 0.09 
INDP 98.64 3.71 0.04 
Electri 4.86 0.30 0.06 
Diese 1.46 0.29 0.20 
Lab/Q 0.08 0.00 0.05 
CS 1.43 0.12 0.09 
PPr 1.49 0.04 0.03 
Cr4 80.94 1.86 0.02 
Ret CR4 36.24 1.46 0.04 
Dispinc 35523.99 698.01 0.02 
ExpB 0.33 0.16 0.49 




CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents the results of the model described in the previous chapter. 
Recall that marketing margins are analyzed between producers and wholesalers, and 
wholesalers and retailers. The chapter begins by briefly describing the method employed 
to analyze marketing margins, and a brief description of the tests used to ensure there are 
no issues with autocorrelation etc. The results of the regression analysis are then 
presented, along with a discussion of whether or not the explanatory variables were found 
to influence marketing margins.  
4.1 Empirical Technique 
The results are obtained using Ordinary Least Squares in Stata. The Breusch Godfrey test 
is employed to test for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the regressions. For all nine 
regressions, this test found no issues with heteroskedasticity except for the margins on 
sirloin steak, negotiated cash, formula contract net and negotiated grid net, where robust 
standard errors were used. The results of the regression analysis of the marketing margins 
are given in tables A.1 to A.4 for the producer wholesaler margins, and tables B.1 to B.5 
for the wholesaler retailer margins. Both sets of tables are located in the appendices. The 
producer wholesaler margins R-square ranged from 0.45 for the margin on negotiated 
grid net to 0.60 for the margin on negotiated cash. For the margins between wholesalers 
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and retailers the R-square in four of the regressions is greater than 0.60. For the margin 
on chuck roast the R-square value is 0.44, with the margin on sirloin steak having an R-
square of 0.85. The effect of the independent variables and their significance is discussed 
below. Elasticities were calculated, and are reported for all variables that were found to 
be significant at the 10% level or better. 
4.2 Lagged Dependent Variable 
To address any issues with autocorrelation, a Durbin Watson statistic is used to 
test for its presence. Where there are issues detected with autocorrelation a lag of the 
dependent variable is included as an independent variable. To ensure that this step solves 
the issue with autocorrelation a Durbin H test is used. This Durbin H test is used because 
the Durbin Watson statistic is not valid with the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. 
A lagged dependent variable is used in margins that appeared to have issues with positive 
autocorrelation after conducting a Durbin Watson statistic, where the statistic was less 
than 1.5, indicating that these regressions have positive autocorrelation. For the margins 
that did not have issues with autocorrelation the lagged dependent variable is not 
included1. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable can be used to test for the 
existence of a relationship between prices in the current month and prices in the previous 
month.  
                                                          
1 Initially these regressions that appeared to not have serious issues with autocorrelation 
lagged dependent variable were included, the coefficient values for this variable did not 




4.2.1 Lagged Dependent Variable in the Wholesaler Retailer Margins 
The results of the regressions show that for three wholesaler retailer margins, the 
lagged dependent variable of the margins on sirloin steak, steak round and round roast are 
significant at the 1% level. If the margin between wholesalers and retailers increased by 
$1 per pound in March, then the margin between wholesalers and retailers in April would 
increase by 57.34, 24.93 and 31.71 cents per pound for the margins on sirloin steak, steak 
round and round roast respectively. Concurrently, the elasticities are 0.57, 0.25 and 0.32 
for the margins on sirloin steak, steak round and round roast respectively. These 
elasticities for the wholesaler retailer margins are all inelastic. This finding may arise 
from the fact that consumers would be expected to reduce the quantity of beef consumed 
if retail beef prices constantly increased from one month to the next. Where the margin 
between wholesalers and retailers increases by $1 in one month, if demand is forecasted 
to continue to increase the retailer may have to pay a premium to wholesalers in the next 
period to keep their shelves stocked. This may explain why the effect of an increase in 
retail prices on wholesaler retailer margins is inelastic for these products.  
4.2.2  Lagged Dependent Variable in the Producer Wholesaler Margins 
Positive autocorrelation was found to be an issue for all four producer wholesaler 
margins. The lagged dependent variables for these margins are all significant at the 1% 
level and all have positive coefficient values. The coefficient values for this variable 
range from 0.53 for the margin on negotiated grid net to 0.65 for the margin on 
negotiated cash. These results like the wholesaler retailer margins do not indicate a strong 
relationship between the margins in the previous month and the current month. The 
elasticities for the lagged dependent variables in producer wholesaler margin equations 
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are all inelastic. The lagged dependent variable for the margin on forward contract net 
and the margin on negotiated grid net are the most inelastic with values of 0.54 and 0.52 
respectively. The elasticity for the lagged dependent variable for the margin on formula 
contract net and the margin on negotiated cash are 0.61 and 0.65. It is expected that under 
business arrangements where prices are agreed upon in advance, prices will not be as 
responsive to recent changes in this case margins between producers and wholesalers. 
The elasticity measure for the margin on negotiated cash which is the largest of the four 
producer wholesaler margins is theoretically consistent with expectations. This is because 
prices under this method of procuring livestock, would be expected to respond quicker to 
market signals, compared to, a forward contract where the producer has locked in the 
price for their livestock in advance of the animals actually being processed. The margin 
on formula contract net’s lagged dependent variable elasticity was the second highest. 
When we consider that formula contracts are linked to attributes the wholesaler wants in 
livestock, which in turn is linked to consumer demands it does seem logical that the 
elasticity measure would be somewhat higher compared to the other contract methods. 
4.3 Beef Retail Prices 
The retail price of beef is used in the margins between producers and wholesalers 
and the retail price for each particular cut is used in the margins between wholesalers and 
retailers. For the margins between producers and wholesalers, we find that changes in the 
retail price of beef have an insignificant effect on margins. As a result, it cannot be 
determined if in fact a change in retail prices is associated with changes in margins 
between producers and wholesalers. 
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For the margins between wholesalers and retailers the coefficient for the retail 
price of each cut is statistically significant for all margins. The retail price of each cut all 
have positive coefficient values, which suggests that, for example, when the retail price 
of sirloin steak increases it results in an increase in the margin on sirloin steak between 
wholesalers and retailers. The elasticities are elastic with the exception being the retail 
price of sirloin steak, where an increase of 1% in retail sirloin steak prices results in the 
margin on sirloin steak increasing by 0.98% which is close to being unit elastic. Margins 
for lower value cuts appear to be more sensitive to a change in retail prices, with the 
margins on chuck roast and round roast having the largest elasticities with values of 1.48 
and 1.22 respectively. 
The retail price of ground beef has the second smallest elasticity with a value of 
1.04, which could be a result of retailers having to compete with fast food outlets and 
restaurants for this product. This explanation is supported by the findings of the 1994-
1996 and 1998 Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by Individuals, which show that for 
processed, stew, steak, beef dishes and other cuts, more than 70% of these products are 
consumed at home. This compares with slightly less than 50% of all ground beef being 
consumed at home (Davis & Lin, 2005). 
Dhoubhadel et al. used the retail price of beef and found this variable to be 
significant for wholesaler retailer beef margins (Dhoubhadel, Castillo, & Capps, 2009). 
In the producer wholesaler margins the retail beef price was significant, which is 
inconsistent with our results which suggest that this variable does not have a significant 
effect on margins between producers and wholesalers, while retail prices do have a 
significant effect on margins between wholesalers and retailers. 
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4.4 Marketing Costs 
In the producer wholesaler margins the price of electricity and labor are included 
to represent costs that the wholesaler would typically incur. After deflating these prices 
the real price of electricity for industry is approximately 0.8 cents per kilowatt hour 
higher at its peak. For the last observation, the electricity price had declined back almost 
to its original level. Electricity prices are found to be insignificant in the producer 
wholesaler margins.  
Labor expenses adjusted for productivity as discussed in the previous chapter are 
insignificant in three of the four producer wholesaler margins. This insignificant result 
may be explained by under negotiated grid net and formula contract net, wholesalers will 
pay for cattle that meet certain specifications by applying a series of premiums and 
discounts. To obtain such animals with the attributes the wholesaler requires may result 
in a reduced ability to pass on an increase in labor costs. For negotiated cash contracts 
wholesalers are more exposed to market conditions when sourcing livestock. As a result 
wholesalers may have reduced bargaining power at certain times in passing on an 
increase in labor expenses to producers. Alternatively, looking at the data for this variable 
it appears that labor expenses for wholesalers relative to industry output have in fact 
declined during this time period.  
The margin on forward contract net is an exception to this finding, as under this 
contract method, labor expenses are found to have a significant and positive result with a 
coefficient value of 0.88 and an elasticity of 0.53. This elasticity is inelastic and suggests 
that if labor expenses were to increase by 1%, would result in the margin on this contract 
increasing by 0.53%. Compared to the other contract methods this result could be linked 
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to forward contracts providing lower risks to producers and hence the wholesaler may 
have greater bargaining power in passing on an increase in labor expenses. 
The cost of labor in the wholesaler retailer margins is found to be significant at 
the 5% level for the margins on chuck ground beef and sirloin steak. The coefficient 
values are -4.99 and -6.56 and the elasticities are 0.57 and 0.29 for the margins on chuck 
ground beef and sirloin steak respectively. The negative margin effect for labor expenses 
suggest that when labor expenses for retailers increase, the margins on chuck ground beef 
and sirloin steak decrease. This suggests that retailers themselves pay for the majority of 
an increase in retail labor costs on these products. This result is somewhat 
counterintuitive, as one might expect when a retailer’s costs increase then margins would 
increase. Alternatively, the high prices beef products have achieved in recent years has 
resulted in consumers paying closer attention to their expenditure on beef, which may 
leave retailers with little option but to absorb the increase in labor costs for these 
products. 
In the wholesaler retailer margins diesel prices were included as a proxy for 
transportation costs. This variable is found to have a statistically significant and negative 
relationship with margins for four products with the exception being the margin on sirloin 
steak which had an insignificant result for diesel prices. The coefficient values for the 
margins on chuck ground beef and chuck roast are -0.16 and -0.15 and the coefficient 
values for the margins on round roast and steak round are both approximately -0.12. If 
diesel prices increase by $1 per gallon this would cause the margin on chuck ground beef 
to decrease by almost 16 cents per pound.  
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The margin on steak round has the smallest elasticity for diesel prices with a value 
of 0.14, which could be due to steak round cuts not being heavily demanded by US 
consumers. Consequently, retailers may have greater bargaining power when negotiating 
with suppliers for this product and may be able to pass on a larger share of an increase in 
transportation costs to wholesalers. The conclusion drawn here about steak rounds being 
demanded less by consumers can be explained by research Lusk et al. conducted on 
consumers’ willingness to pay for tender beef products. Lusk et al. note that consumers 
are likely to have a preference for tender meat, which would be expected, while steak 
round cuts are known to be less tender compared to other cuts. In this research, the results 
indicate that a little over half of the sample were willing to pay on average a premium of 
$1.84 per pound for a tender steak (Lusk, Fox , Schroeder, & Mintert, 2010). 
The elasticities for diesel prices for the margins on chuck ground beef (0.33) and 
chuck roast (0.22) are larger compared to the elasticities for the margins on round roast 
(0.17) and steak round (0.14). This indicates that for lower value products like ground 
beef, their margins between wholesalers and retailers appear to be more sensitive to a 
change in transportation costs. Consequently, retailers might pay a larger share of the 
increase in transportation costs for chuck ground beef and chuck roasts.  
Electricity costs in the wholesaler retailer margins are included in the analysis 
using commercial electricity prices reported by the Energy Information Administration. 
This variable is significant for the margins on chuck ground beef, steak round and round 
roast. The effect of a change in electricity prices appears to have the largest effect on the 
margin on chuck ground beef with a coefficient value of 0.11, compared to the margins 
on round roast and steak round which have coefficient values of 0.07 and 0.08. These 
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results suggest that when electricity prices increase, the wholesaler retailer margins for 
these products will increase by approximately 7 to 11 cents per pound. Chuck ground 
beef margins appear to be the most sensitive to a change in electricity prices with an 
elasticity of 0.80, compared to the elasticities for the price of electricity on the margins 
on round roast and steak round which are approximately 0.32.  
When we compare the above findings to similar work, Marsh and Brester use the 
cost of labor, which was found to be significant at the 10% level for beef wholesaler 
retailer margins and it had a positive effect on margins. However, the variable for labor 
expenses in our analysis is different, as it was adjusted for productivity. Furthermore, 
Marsh and Brester’s research was conducted for a different time period, in which labor 
productivity for retail stores was said to be declining (Marsh & Brester, 2004). An index 
of marketing costs was also found to be significant and had a negative effect on margins 
(Marsh and Brester, 2004). Other researchers used an index of costs, and found this 
variable to be insignificant for margins between producers and wholesalers and 
wholesalers and retailers (Armah, 2012; Pendell, 2003; Dhoubhadel, Castillo, & Capps, 
2009).  
4.5 Wholesaler and Retailer Concentration 
The four-firm concentration ratio for wholesalers and retailers are analyzed to test 
for their effects on margins. Wholesaler concentration is included in both producer 
wholesaler and wholesaler retailer margins. In the producer wholesaler margins 
wholesaler concentration did not have a statistically significant effect on margins. This 
finding lends support to the argument that increases in concentration amongst 
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wholesalers could be motivated by other factors, and not necessarily driven by attempts 
to pay lower prices for live cattle.  
For margins between wholesalers and retailers, wholesaler concentration for the 
top four firms is significant for the margins on chuck ground beef, chuck roast and sirloin 
steak, and has a negative relationship with margins for these products. The elasticities are 
2.94, 3.31 and 1.15 for the margins on chuck ground beef, chuck roast and sirloin steak 
respectively, if wholesaler concentration increases by 1%, the margin on sirloin steak 
declines by approximately 1.15%. This is certainly interesting compared to the 
insignificant result for this variable for the margins on round roast and steak round. The 
elasticities for this variable indicate that margins for chuck ground beef, chuck roast and 
sirloin steak are very sensitive to changes in wholesaler concentration. Two issues to 
consider are the controversy concerning the use finely textured beef (FTB), and US 
livestock production is currently at its lowest level in over fifty years. It has been 
suggested that these events have caused a shortage of ground beef as wholesalers are now 
limited to whole and lean muscle products and has caused wholesaler costs to increase 
(Watson, 2012), which may give wholesalers greater bargaining power.  
Retailer concentration for the top four firms was found to be statistically 
significant with a positive coefficient only for the margin on sirloin steak. This indicates 
that retailers may pay lower prices for this product when concentration at the retail level 
increases.  
The four-firm concentration ratio for retailers, which was insignificant for most 
cuts except for the margin on sirloin steak, is consistent with what Dhoubhadel et al. 
found (Dhoubhadel, Castillo, & Capps, 2009). In contrast, Marsh and Brester find the 
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retailer four-firm concentration ratio to be significant and positive. However, in Marsh 
and Brester’s analysis, the four-firm concentration ratio for retailers has a higher value, 
with an average value of approximately 26% higher, compared to the average value used 
in this analysis. Finally, Marsh and Brester’s analysis looked at a different time period 
(from 1970 to 1998) using annual data which might explain some of the different results 
they found compared to the results in this research (Marsh & Brester, 2004).  
One final point with respect to concentration is that these measures are at the 
national level. Concentration of wholesalers and/or retailers in different regions or areas 
throughout the US may vary, hence the ability to force one’s suppliers (customers) to 
accept a lower (higher) price for product may vary by region. However, actual evidence 
of concentration is somewhat limited in terms of its use by firms to behave in an 
uncompetitive manner in the beef industry. This does not necessarily mean that future 
increases in concentration will have no effect on most margins for beef, as our findings 
suggest. 
4.6 Cold Storage 
Cold storage has been considered to have a strategic role for industry participants 
in managing supply. Cold storage could also be used as a tool to avoid having to deal in 
challenging market conditions. Henderson used cold storage as a measure of capacity in 
the pork industry (Henderson, 2001). However, this variable is found to be insignificant 
in his analysis. In this research cold storage appears to have an insignificant effect on 
margins between producers and wholesalers. This insignificant finding could be due to 
decline in beef production in the US in recent years.  
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For margins between wholesalers and retailers cold storage is found to have a 
significant and negative effect for the margins on round roast and steak round. The 
coefficient values for this variable are -0.16 for both margins -- where cold storage 
increases by one pound per capita will cause the margins on round roast and steak round 
to decrease by approximately 16 cents per pound. The elasticities are 0.22 and 0.19 for 
the margin on round roast and steak round respectively. This negative result could be due 
to wholesalers passing on the cost of storing beef to retailers through charging higher 
prices for these products.  
4.7 Substitutes 
The wholesale price of pork is used as a proxy for substitutes in the producer 
wholesaler margins. The wholesale price of pork is statistically insignificant for the 
margin on negotiated cash and the margin on formula contract net. The coefficients of 
this variable for the margins on forward contract net and negotiated grid net are 0.32 and 
0.15 and the elasticities are 0.50 and 0.23 respectively. This indicates that, where the 
wholesale price of pork increases under these two procurement methods, wholesalers are 
able to respond to this change by paying lower prices for beef, causing margins between 
producers and wholesalers to increase. The lack of significance for the margin on 
negotiated cash and formula contracts could indicate that firms may not be able to 
respond to changes in the price of substitutes that take place in the same month due to 
market conditions the firm might be operating in. Alternatively, wholesalers may be 
unable to pay lower prices under formula contracts to obtain the cattle with the attributes 
the wholesaler might require.  
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For the wholesaler retailer margins the retail price of pork is used as a proxy for 
substitutes -- it was found only to be significant and positive for the margin on sirloin 
steak. This is inconsistent with what Marsh and Brester observed, where substitutes were 
found to be insignificant for beef margins between wholesalers and retailers. However, 
sirloin steak is considered to be a luxury product compared to the more affordable beef 
cuts, so it seems logical that substitutes could have an effect on margins for this product. 
This result would suggest that if the retail price of pork were to increase by $1 per pound, 
it would cause the margin on sirloin steak to increase by $1.13 per pound. The elasticity 
for the retail price of pork in the margin on sirloin steak is 0.96, which indicates that the 
margin on sirloin steak is quite sensitive to a change in the retail price of pork. 
In Marsh and Brester’s and Armah’s results, substitutes are insignificant using the 
wholesale and retail price of pork as in this analysis (Marsh & Brester, 2004; Armah, 
2012). This is inconsistent with our results, where there appears to be at least some 
evidence that substitutes do effect some margins between wholesalers and retailers. 
4.8 Disposable Income 
Interestingly, disposable income is insignificant for the margins between 
wholesalers and retailers. This variable is significant at the 10% level for the margin on 
formula contract net and significant at the 5% level for the margin on negotiated cash. 
Both coefficient values are positive which suggest that, where real disposable income 
increases, margins between producers and wholesalers increase. The elasticities for the 
disposable income variable are elastic with an elasticity value of 1.05 and 1.38 for the 
margins on formula contract net and negotiated cash respectively.  
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This significant and positive margin effect for this variable can possibly be 
explained by where consumers’ disposable income increases could mean that consumers 
can afford to demand more marketing services even though their actual consumption of 
beef may not change drastically. However these marketing services come at a cost and it 
may be the case that wholesalers incurring such costs, such as establishing schemes like 
an Angus quality assurance scheme may be passed on to producers in the form of lower 
prices for cattle sourced through formula or negotiated cash contracts. Another such 
example is research done by Wheeler et al. on meat tenderness obtained an estimate for 
the cost of using an automatic and manual beef classification system for a wholesaler. 
This process was estimated to increase costs by $4.36 per carcass or 62 cents per cwt. for 
the automatic system and $8.50 per carcass or $1.21 per cwt. for the manual system 
(Wheeler, Shackleford, & Koohmarie, 1999). Therefore, if disposable income were to 
increase, it could result in consumers demanding more services, as mentioned above. The 
insignificance of the variable for retailers might be explained by the retail store acting 
primarily as a point of sale, but lacking the same scope to expand the level of marketing 
services, compared to wholesalers. This may be especially true with increased use of 
meat products being sold in pre-packaged containers or trays. Marsh and Brester use real 
per capita consumption expenditures, which was found to be significant for the 
wholesaler retailer margin for beef (Marsh & Brester, 2004). However, in their analysis, 
different beef cuts were not considered. 
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4.9 Wholesaler Productivity 
Wholesaler productivity is used in both producer wholesaler margins and 
wholesaler retailer margins. For margins between producers and wholesalers, the 
productivity index was found to have a statistically insignificant effect on margins.  
The index is statistically significant for the margins on chuck ground beef, chuck 
roast and round roast. These results suggest that where a 1% increase in productivity for 
wholesalers occurs, margins will increase by approximately 0.9 to 1.8 cents per pound for 
these three cuts. This evidence indicates that for lower value beef products, wholesalers 
pass on at least some of the benefits in productivity to downstream firms through 
charging lower prices for these products. The elasticities for wholesaler productivity are 
2.04 1.76, and 0.78 for the margins on chuck ground beef, chuck roast and round roast 
respectively. These elasticities are elastic for the margins on chuck ground beef and 
chuck roast. The margin on round roast, which has a higher margin on average, has a 
lower elasticity which in this case is inelastic. These elasticities provide more evidence 
that for the lower value or lower margin products, wholesalers pass on improvements in 
productivity to downstream firms.  
For the margins on steak round and sirloin steak, this variable is insignificant. 
This may be due to wholesalers not passing on cost savings arising from improvements in 
productivity on these cuts. Alternatively, the wholesaler may be passing on all of the 
potential benefits to retailers through charging lower prices on lower value cuts where 
competition may be more intense. Another explanation for these results is that typically 
the low value products such as ground beef may require more extensive processing 
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compared to steaks, so there may be greater scope or potential to achieve efficiencies or 
productivity enhancements on certain products. 
4.10 Supply Boom 
The inclusion of the supply boom variable is used to test for the effect such an 
event may have on margins between producers and wholesalers. For instance, during a 
temporary supply boom, do wholesalers compete more aggressively to obtain supplies by 
paying more for live cattle?  
The supply boom variable is statistically significant for three of the producer 
wholesaler margins and had a negative coefficient value which suggests that wholesalers 
would attempt to pay more for cattle in periods where a temporary supply boom might 
occur. The elasticities for this variable on the margins on negotiated grid net, negotiated 
cash and formula contract net are 0.11, 0.11 and 0.13 respectively. This provides 
evidence that the effect of this variable on margins is inelastic. This finding is consistent 
with the theory described in the previous chapter that in an industry characterized as an 
oligopoly competitive action could increase by paying higher prices for cattle during an 
anticipated supply boom. The results regarding the margin on forward contracts are an 
exception to this finding, as the variable is statistically insignificant. 
In Henderson’s analysis of the pork industry, he found the supply boom measure 
to have an insignificant effect on competition in the market for live hogs (Henderson, 
2001). However, Henderson’s research focused on the US hog industry for a different 
time period. Compared to the US beef industry of today, which has seen cattle production 
at its lowest point in over fifty years in the US, along with an increased demand for 
protein from emerging economies. 
79 
 
4.11  Capacity Utilization 
The capacity utilization rate was used to analyze whether, in the event of excess 
capacity being present, to determine did this result in wholesalers attempting to pay more 
for cattle to increase their utilization of capacity. This variable is found to be statistically 
insignificant for all four producer wholesaler margins. The insignificancy of this variable 
leads us to conclude that capacity utilization does not appear to affect margins between 
producers and wholesalers. If there is excess capacity the industry may be willing to 
tolerate this excess capacity, to provide a credible threat to new entrants. This threat is 
one of the potential reasons for having excess capacity according to Stigler, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. Alternatively, there may be no excess capacity in the meat 
wholesaling sector. The variable used here was for the NAICS code 311 and so this 
measure may not be fully representative of capacity utilization of the meat wholesaling 
sector. Lastly, in the Livestock Dairy and Poultry Market outlook reports, it was 
suggested that the returns for wholesalers from purchasing cattle were negative. If this is 
indeed the case, even if there is excess capacity if a firm cannot reasonably expect to 
make a profit or to cover variable costs then such a firm will not be motivated to increase 
capacity utilization. 
4.12 Imports and Exports 
4.12.1 Exports of Beef 
In the wholesale retailer margins one would expect that an increase in exports, 
would cause margins to decrease, as retailers theoretically would have to compete with 
foreign competitors for US processed beef. In the regression results there is no evidence 
of this relationship -- because the exports variable is insignificant for all five wholesaler 
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retailer margins. One factor to consider with respect to the export of US beef is that BSE 
was discovered in the US in December 2003, four months prior to the first observation 
used in this analysis. The consequences of this were that exports of beef decreased post 
December 2003, with the US being refused access to foreign beef markets such as Japan 
until 2006. After 2006, this market partially reopened while others like Australia and 
Brazil still have not reopened their markets to US beef (Seng, 2013). 
4.12.2. Imports of Beef 
The expectation is that an increase in beef imports could mean more beef is 
available to meet consumer demands, and would cause margins between wholesalers and 
retailers to increase. Imports are found to be insignificant in all five wholesaler retailer 
margins analyzed. When one considers that imports mostly consist of lower value beef 
cuts to be mixed with US produced beef, an increase in beef imports may not have the 
effect on margins as one might expect initially (ERS, 2014b). The effect on margins for 
the higher value products such as round, roast, steak round and sirloin steak may not be 
important due to imports consisting mostly of lower value beef products (ERS, 2014b).  
Marsh and Brester find imports to have a significant and positive effect on 
margins between wholesalers and retailers (Marsh & Brester, 2004). However, this 
finding is again based on a different time period when beef animal numbers in the US 
were much higher compared to today.
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
This analysis has provided some interesting results for margins between producers 
and wholesalers and margins between wholesalers and retailers. Unlike other work on 
beef marketing margins, our results show that the effect of explanatory variables is not 
the same for different procurement methods or for different cuts of beef.  
The dissimilar results for different cuts of beef could be due to the processing of 
beef, which results in products with different attributes. The finding for wholesaler 
productivity could support this conclusion, as wholesaler productivity was found to be 
significant and had a positive effect on low margin products between wholesalers and 
retailers. This finding could be a result of wholesalers having greater potential to realize 
productivity improvements on products like ground beef, which require more extensive 
processing compared to steak products. Subsequently wholesalers may pass some of 
these productivity improvements on to retailers through charging a lower price for 
products like ground beef. 
These results also indicate that the bargaining power amongst supply chain participants 
may also differ over different contractual arrangements or cuts, which we have suggested 
may be linked to the attributes of that specific contract or cut of beef. For margins 
between producers and wholesalers and wholesalers and retailers, it appears that some of 
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the increases in the margins could potentially be due to increases in costs of labor or 
marketing services. For instance, diesel prices were found to have a significant effect on 
decreasing wholesaler retailer margins, although low value products appeared to be more 
sensitive to a change in diesel prices, as evidenced by the magnitude of the  coefficient 
values and their respective elasticities.  
The results indicate that the wholesaler concentration appears to have no effect on 
producer wholesaler margins at the national level. This is despite the issue of downstream 
firms being highly concentrated constantly being raised as a contributing factor to an 
uncompetitive environment in live cattle markets. One of the potential benefits of 
consolidation of an industry is that it can reduce per unit costs. Evidence in the past has 
indicated that at least some of these cost savings have been passed on to producers. If this 
result were true, then one would expect that the four-firm concentration ratio would have 
a negative relationship with producer wholesaler margins. However, this variable was 
insignificant for all four producer wholesaler margins which would suggest that current 
cost savings arising from further consolidation are not being passed on to producers in the 
form of higher prices. Alternatively, this insignificance might indicate that cost savings 
arising from consolidation have been exhausted. 
The results of this analysis provide support to the idea that some products like 
ground beef and steaks will be demanded more by consumers, potentially leading to 
reduced bargaining power for retailers. For instance, the four-firm concentration ratio for 




The primary limitation of this type of research is that the analysis uses gross 
margins and not actual net margins after variable costs are factored in. Future research 
could attempt to address this issue if it were possible to obtain or estimate costs for 
wholesalers and retailers. Another limitation is that for the producer wholesaler margins 
the same wholesale price of beef was used to calculate these margins. One might expect 
cattle sold under a formula contract or negotiated grid may be of higher quality and hence 
may receive a higher wholesale price, a factor our approach does not consider.  
This research is carried out at the national level and as a result assumes that the 
conditions industry participants operate in is the same regardless of location. In reality, 
this may not be the case, especially in different locations: the CR4 measures may be 
different, as mentioned previously. Future research could try to address this issue of the 
effect of firm concentration by looking at more regional markets or locations to see is it 
an important factor and in what way. 
5.2 Future Research 
An exhaustive selection of variables could be used to explain margins in the beef 
industry, and certainly it would appear that there may be other factors that this analysis 
has not accounted for. Other work in this area has used the inclusion of variables relating 
to media reports (Lloyd T. , McCorriston, Morgan, Rayner, & Weldegebriel, 2009). In 
times of where food production is becoming more of an emotional issue and the media 
having a greater influence. Understanding drivers of demand and how they affect margins 
by the inclusion of such variables may uncover some facts or contribute to obtaining 
insightful research findings. For example, some variable that can be related to media 
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reports positive or negative could offer some more insights. In Tonsor et al.’s article, for 
example, an analysis is conducted on the drivers of demand in the beef industry, and they 
suggest that where new health benefits are uncovered from consuming a product, may 
shift demand (Tonsor, Mintert , & Schroeder, 2010).  
Other research could use a similar type of analysis in other product markets such 
as pork to test for different relationships across different cuts of pork or across different 
procurement methods for live hogs. Likewise, this analysis could be repeated for beef 
margins where data for other cuts can be obtained or if more information regarding live 
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Appendix A. Empirical Results for Producer Wholesaler Margins 
- Significance is shown as: * for 10% level, ** for 5% level and *** for 1% 
level. 
- Standard errors are shown below the coefficient values in parentheses. 
 
Table A.1 Margin on Formula Contract 























































Table A.2 Margin on Forward Contract Net 
 
 






Variable Coefficient Elasticity 
MForwC lag-1 0.5733*** 0.5765 
  (0.0889)   
Br -0.1577  
  (0.1786)  
Electri -9.76e-05   
  (0.0351)   
Lab/Q 0.8808** 0.5272 
  (0.3674)  
INDP -0.0012   
  (0.0032)   
CS -0.0226   
  (0.0468)   
SB -0.0600   
  (0.0371)   
Dispinc 1.26e-05   
  (1.21e-05)   
PPw 0.3196*** 0.4973 
  (0.1214)   
Util 0.0027   
  (0.0051)   
Cr4 5.47e-05   
  (0.0055)   
cons -0.3662   
  (0.9332)   
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Table A.3 Margin on Negotiated Grid Net 
Variable Coeffcient Elasticity 
























































Table A.4 Margin on Negotiated Cash 
Variable Coeefficient Elasticity 























































Appendix B. Empirical Results for Wholesaler Retailer Margins 
Table B.1 Margin on Chuck Roast 








    
Diese  -0.1482*** 
 (0.0447) 
0.2187 










































    







Table B.2 Margin on Round Roast 
Variable Coefficient Elasticity 











    
Diese  -0.1230*** 
 (0.0295) 
0.1669 








































    






Table B.3 Margin on Chuck Ground Beef 








    
Diese  -0.1552*** 
 (0.0291) 
0.3323 








































    








Table B.4 Margin on Steak Round 
Variable Coefficient Elasticity 























































    







Table B.5 Margin on Sirloin Steak 
Variable Coefficient Elasticity 























































    
R square: 0.8581







Appendix C. Correlation Matrices of Regression Coefficients 





MFC lag - 1 Br Elect Lab/Q INDP CS SB DispInc PPw Util Cr4 _cons 
MFC lag - 1 1.0000           
Br -0.3488 1.0000           
Elect -0.3492 0.6048 1.0000           
Lab/Q -0.2813 0.1019 0.2541 1.0000           
INDP 0.2864 0.1363 -0.0846 0.3812 1.0000           
CS -0.1076 0.3491 0.5009 0.0674 -0.1373 1.0000           
SB -0.0396 0.1280 0.0294 -0.4300 -0.1487 -0.0808 1.0000           
DispInc -0.2520 -0.1565 -0.0085 -0.1299 -0.6985 -0.0573 -0.0023 1.0000           
PPw -0.1104 -0.2925 0.0141 0.5946 0.3803 0.0271 -0.3330 -0.1498 1.0000           
Util -0.2059 0.2754 0.3728 0.1290 0.1820 -0.1945 0.0704 -0.0021 -0.0753 1.0000           
Cr4 -0.2691 0.3454 0.4837 0.0063 -0.6188 0.5634 -0.0224 0.2274 -0.3574 -0.1738 1.0000           
_cons 0.3923 -0.7876 -0.7935 -0.3623 -0.0259 -0.4018 0.0229 -0.1076 0.1086 -0.5761 -0.4545 1.0000







Table C.2 Correlation Matrix of Regression Coefficients for Margin on Forward Contract Net 
 
MForwC lag -1 Br Electri Lab/Q INDP CS SB Dispinc PPw Util Cr4 _cons 
MForwC lag -1 1.0000           
Br -0.2465 1.0000           
Electri -0.2908 0.6202 1.0000           
Lab/Q -0.1145 -0.0555 0.1733 1.0000           
INDP 0.0897 0.0907 -0.1191 0.2971 1.0000           
CS 0.0245 0.5081 0.4237 -0.0923 -0.0013 1.0000           
SB -0.0366 0.1604 -0.0034 -0.4396 -0.0397 -0.0671 1.0000           
Dispinc 0.0775 -0.1600 -0.1735 0.0003 -0.5729 -0.2456 -0.0347 1.0000           
PPw -0.1966 -0.3297 -0.1275 0.4640 0.3759 -0.1910 -0.1484 0.0180 1.0000           
Util -0.2698 0.3215 0.4593 0.2324 0.1075 0.0282 -0.0285 0.0537 -0.0303 1.0000           
Cr4 -0.2035 0.3864 0.5102 -0.0578 -0.5788 0.4169 -0.0258 -0.0660 -0.5296 -0.0039 1.0000           
_cons 0.2738 -0.7691 -0.7264 -0.2819 0.0664 -0.4034 0.0107 -0.1551 0.1791 -0.6979 -0.4398 1.0000







Table C.3 Correlation Matrix of Regression Coefficients for the Margin on Negotiated Grid Net 
 
MNGN lag - 1 Br Elect Lab/Q INDP CS SB DispInc PPw Util Cr4 _cons 
MNGN lag - 1 1.0000           
Br -0.3459 1.0000           
Elect -0.2696 0.6300 1.0000           
Lab/Q -0.2612 0.1214 0.2430 1.0000           
INDP 0.2914 0.1052 0.0234 0.3252 1.0000           
CS 0.0222 0.4287 0.4126 -0.0051 -0.0330 1.0000           
SB -0.1707 0.2483 0.1431 -0.3675 -0.0951 -0.0233 1.0000           
DispInc -0.2214 -0.1069 -0.0377 -0.0889 -0.7091 -0.1140 -0.0540 1.0000           
PPw 0.0538 -0.3254 -0.0146 0.4820 0.4872 -0.0586 -0.2962 -0.2093 1.0000           
Util -0.2665 0.2901 0.4519 0.1628 0.1421 -0.1496 0.1503 -0.0183 -0.1214 1.0000           
Cr4 -0.2582 0.4048 0.3188 0.0121 -0.6045 0.4832 0.0297 0.2333 -0.5319 -0.1199 1.0000           
_cons 0.3693 -0.8203 -0.7691 -0.3486 0.0078 -0.4029 -0.1124 -0.1387 0.2320 -0.5891 -0.4760 1.0000














MNC lag - 1 Br Elect Lab/Q INDP CS SB DispInc PPw Util Cr4 _cons 
MNC lag - 1 1.0000           
Br -0.2759 1.0000           
Elect -0.4303 0.6251 1.0000           
Lab/Q -0.3608 0.1669 0.3457 1.0000           
INDP 0.2752 0.2555 0.1020 0.3653 1.0000           
CS -0.1230 0.3237 0.4261 0.1519 -0.0742 1.0000           
SB -0.0115 0.1283 0.0391 -0.4371 -0.0353 -0.0955 1.0000           
DispInc -0.1702 -0.1971 -0.0696 -0.2088 -0.6986 -0.0608 -0.0041 1.0000           
PPw -0.1319 -0.1938 0.1329 0.5958 0.3955 0.1094 -0.3239 -0.1726 1.0000           
Util -0.2512 0.2748 0.4310 0.0841 0.2140 -0.1928 0.1484 -0.0151 -0.0577 1.0000           
Cr4 -0.2890 0.2602 0.3202 0.1238 -0.5645 0.4972 -0.1745 0.1772 -0.3533 -0.2461 1.0000           
_cons 0.3833 -0.7935 -0.8140 -0.3931 -0.1628 -0.3652 0.0007 -0.0424 0.0353 -0.5990 -0.3324 1.0000













CRr INDP Electri Diese Lab/Q CS PPr Cr4 RetCR4 Dispinc ExpB ImpB _cons 
CRr 1.0000           
INDP 0.2566 1.0000           
Electri 0.4668 -0.0251 1.0000           
Diese 0.1388 -0.1819 -0.1273 1.0000           
Lab/Q 0.0911 -0.0223 -0.1001 0.3229 1.0000           
CS 0.2034 -0.1023 0.0036 0.3895 0.2262 1.0000           
PPr 0.0750 0.0931 -0.1209 -0.0218 -0.0629 0.1443 1.0000           
Cr4 -0.1487 -0.4897 0.1312 0.3768 0.3002 0.5082 -0.2971 1.0000           
RetCR4 -0.2120 -0.2698 -0.3646 0.3506 0.2502 0.5525 0.3714 0.5443 1.0000           
Dispinc 0.1350 -0.2932 0.1192 -0.3244 0.0892 -0.3746 0.1272 -0.2929 -0.3314 1.0000           
ExpB -0.2112 -0.0521 -0.2560 -0.0041 0.1488 0.0889 -0.2016 -0.1497 -0.1958 -0.1042 1.0000           
ImpB 0.2914 0.0772 -0.0224 0.4637 0.4113 0.6801 0.0891 0.4993 0.5501 -0.2662 0.1101 1.0000
_cons -0.2974 0.1765 -0.1526 -0.2762 -0.5292 -0.5550 -0.3720 -0.5485 -0.6144 -0.1809 0.3293 -0.6903 1.0000













MRR lag -1 RRr INDP Electri Diese Lab/Q CS PPr Cr4 RetCR4 Dispinc ExpB ImpB _cons 
MRR lag -1 1.0000           
RRr -0.1787 1.0000           
INDP -0.0126 0.3372 1.0000           
Electri -0.1830 0.4104 -0.0113 1.0000           
Diese 0.3849 -0.1023 -0.2135 -0.2665 1.0000           
Lab/Q 0.1667 -0.1706 -0.0943 -0.2285 0.3521 1.0000           
CS 0.2123 0.0824 -0.1099 -0.0845 0.4108 0.2193 1.0000           
PPr -0.1346 0.1195 0.1058 -0.0959 -0.0847 -0.1039 0.1097 1.0000           
Cr4 0.1114 -0.0321 -0.4471 0.1812 0.4152 0.3292 0.5579 -0.3004 1.0000           
RetCR4 -0.1048 -0.0534 -0.2363 -0.2849 0.3213 0.2610 0.5673 0.3957 0.5122 1.0000           
Dispinc 0.0489 -0.0374 -0.3319 0.0377 -0.3022 0.0883 -0.3943 0.1073 -0.2705 -0.3126 1.0000           
ExpB -0.0435 -0.1824 -0.0632 -0.2278 0.0134 0.1855 0.0980 -0.1971 -0.1849 -0.2261 -0.0730 1.0000
ImpB -0.0824 0.1192 0.0397 -0.1122 0.3731 0.3615 0.6323 0.0902 0.5543 0.6441 -0.3261 0.1613 1.0000           
_cons -0.0950 -0.2984 0.1348 -0.1195 -0.2416 -0.4555 -0.5428 -0.3597 -0.5945 -0.6452 -0.1353 0.3299 -0.6435 1.0000













CGBr INDP Electri Diese Lab/Q CS PPr Cr4 RetCR4 Dispinc ExpB ImpB _cons 
CGBr 1.0000           
INDP 0.2076 1.0000           
Electri 0.3016 -0.0955 1.0000           
Diese 0.0338 -0.2151 -0.1987 1.0000           
Lab/Q -0.1487 -0.0768 -0.1976 0.3059 1.0000           
CS -0.0842 -0.1766 -0.1257 0.3682 0.2224 1.0000           
PPr -0.1089 0.0520 -0.2004 -0.0361 -0.0528 0.1401 1.0000           
Cr4 -0.1092 -0.4821 0.1845 0.3994 0.3294 0.5600 -0.2747 1.0000           
RetCR4 -0.5696 -0.3016 -0.4127 0.3033 0.3098 0.5578 0.3867 0.4957 1.0000           
Dispinc -0.1639 -0.3643 0.0108 -0.3503 0.1004 -0.3936 0.1340 -0.2552 -0.1601 1.0000           
ExpB -0.2434 -0.0484 -0.2418 0.0171 0.2018 0.1537 -0.1573 -0.1541 -0.0621 -0.0349 1.0000           
ImpB -0.2088 -0.0408 -0.2376 0.4297 0.4216 0.6635 0.0912 0.5804 0.6450 -0.2768 0.2249 1.0000
_cons 0.0533 0.2787 0.0006 -0.2461 -0.5294 -0.5309 -0.3704 -0.6289 -0.6263 -0.1553 0.2636 -0.6566 1.0000












MSR lag -1 SRr INDP Electri Diese Lab/Q CS PPr Cr4 RetCR4 Dispinc ExpB ImpB _cons 
MSR lag -1 1.0000           
SRr 0.1446 1.0000           
INDP 0.0428 0.3999 1.0000           
Electri -0.2788 0.1549 -0.0795 1.0000           
Diese 0.2976 -0.2255 -0.2858 -0.3251 1.0000           
Lab/Q 0.1189 -0.1693 -0.1123 -0.2188 0.3672 1.0000           
CS 0.1576 -0.0049 -0.1521 -0.1474 0.3912 0.2289 1.0000           
PPr -0.0453 0.2008 0.1501 -0.1083 -0.0995 -0.1117 0.1144 1.0000           
Cr4 0.2198 -0.0192 -0.4329 0.1386 0.4412 0.3384 0.5709 -0.2967 1.0000           
RetCR4 0.2347 0.2359 -0.1073 -0.2997 0.3560 0.2461 0.6153 0.4011 0.5323 1.0000           
Dispinc 0.0246 0.0168 -0.3072 0.0560 -0.3163 0.0764 -0.4054 0.1174 -0.2665 -0.2885 1.0000           
ExpB -0.1051 -0.1823 -0.0697 -0.1717 0.0379 0.1843 0.1215 -0.2131 -0.1933 -0.2937 -0.0814 1.0000
ImpB -0.0540 0.0201 0.0113 -0.1551 0.3845 0.3812 0.6438 0.0771 0.5444 0.6140 -0.3226 0.1805 1.0000           
_cons -0.3507 -0.4575 0.0327 0.0038 -0.1842 -0.3974 -0.4831 -0.3721 -0.5705 -0.7469 -0.1393 0.3418 -0.5478 1.0000











MSS lag -1 SSr INDP Electri Diese Lab/Q CS PPr Cr4 RetCR4 Dispinc ExpB ImpB _cons 
MSS lag -1 1.0000           
SSr -0.4156 1.0000           
INDP 0.2609 -0.2530 1.0000           
Electri 0.2642 -0.1123 0.2204 1.0000           
Diese 0.2201 -0.4059 -0.0341 -0.0410 1.0000           
Lab/Q 0.4010 -0.4869 0.2755 -0.0808 0.3964 1.0000           
CS -0.0061 -0.2098 -0.1062 -0.2865 0.3664 0.2588 1.0000           
PPr -0.0368 -0.0598 0.0580 -0.2634 0.1228 -0.0380 0.5078 1.0000           
Cr4 0.4137 -0.1536 -0.1848 0.1767 0.3223 0.4838 0.4177 -0.1741 1.0000           
RetCR4 0.0884 0.0166 -0.1560 -0.3045 0.2881 0.2184 0.7133 0.5801 0.5186 1.0000           
Dispinc 0.0190 0.2184 -0.1786 -0.0238 -0.5612 -0.0460 -0.4223 -0.2064 -0.1877 -0.3489 1.0000           
ExpB 0.1526 -0.2002 -0.1703 -0.2367 0.2416 0.2262 0.1875 -0.1366 -0.0110 -0.1663 -0.0148 1.0000
ImpB 0.4478 -0.5715 0.2601 -0.0291 0.5110 0.6671 0.6679 0.2656 0.6381 0.6065 -0.3188 0.1996 1.0000           
_cons -0.4503 0.1297 -0.1444 -0.0173 -0.2038 -0.5495 -0.5690 -0.3941 -0.7112 -0.7606 0.0260 0.1315 -0.7806 1.0000
